「平和のための原子力」計画がもたらした核の不安 Atomic Assistance : How 'Atoms for Peace' Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

「平和のための原子力」計画がもたらした核の不安<br>Atomic Assistance : How 'Atoms for Peace' Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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「平和のための原子力」計画がもたらした核の不安
Atomic Assistance : How 'Atoms for Peace' Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Fuhrmann, Matthew

ウェブストア価格 ¥32,256（本体¥29,324）
Cornell University Press（2012/07発売）
外貨定価 US$ 145.00
ポイント 293pt

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製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 344 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9780801450907
DDC分類 327.1747

基本説明

Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. He draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace", including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. The book also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria.

Full Description

Nuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. Nuclear suppliers hope that they can reap the benefits of foreign aid—improving relationships with their allies, limiting the influence of their adversaries, enhancing their energy security by gaining favorable access to oil supplies—without undermining their security. By providing peaceful nuclear assistance, however, countries inadvertently help spread nuclear weapons.

Fuhrmann draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace," including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. He also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria to determine why states began (or did not begin) nuclear weapons programs and why some programs succeeded while others failed. Fuhrmann concludes that, on average, countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb—especially if they experience an international crisis after receiving aid.

Introduction: Unintended Consequences in International Politics1. Definitions and Patterns of Peaceful Nuclear CooperationPart I: Atoms for Peace2. Economic Statecraft and Atoms for Peace: A Theory of Peaceful Nuclear Assistance3. The Historical Record: A First Cut4. Nuclear Arms and Infl uence: Assisting India, Iran, and Libya5. The Thirst for Oil and Other Motives: Nine Puzzling Cases of Assistance6. Oil for Peaceful Nuclear Assistance?Part II: Atoms for War7. Spreading Temptation: Why Nuclear Export Strategies Backfire8. Who Builds Bombs? How Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Facilitates the Spread of Nuclear Weapons9. Have International Institutions Made the World Safer?Conclusion: What Peaceful Nuclear Assistance Teaches Us about International RelationsNotes
Index