Full Description
This book will spark a debate concerning the need for democracy and accountability in the governance of trillions of dollars of plan members' pension plan assets and the legitimacy of the present, mostly unaccountable, corporate governance decisions made by these plans. The author analyzes the reasons for this passivity, pointing to conflicts of interest with respect to corporate governance activity in pension plans and also to limitations in corporate, securities, and pension law. He argues that plan members should be given a voice in pension plan governance and the plans made accountable, and he outlines the legal reforms necessary.
Contents
Introduction
1 Corporate Investment by Employee Pension Funds: A Deal with the Devil?
2 Pension Fund Assets and Plan Members: A Question of Ownership?
3 The Duties of Pension Fund Managers towards Plan Members with Respect to the Governance of Investee Corporations
4 Corporate Law's Opportunities and Limitations for Pension Fund Corporate Governance Activity
5 The Enhancing and Constraining Effects of Securities Regulation on Corporate Governance by Pension Funds
6 Designing Democratic Corporate Governance Accountability Options
7 Conclusion: Pension Funds Must Be Accountable to Plan Members for Using Corporate Governance to Enhance Corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance Performance
Notes
Bibliography
Index
