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Full Description
This textbook is an introduction to game theory, which is the systematic analysis of decision-making in interactive settings. Game theory can be of great value to business managers. The ability to correctly anticipate countermove by rival firms in competitive and cooperative settings enables managers to make more effective marketing, advertising, pricing, and other business decisions to optimally achieve the firm's objectives. Game theory does not always accurately predict how rivals will act in strategic situations, but does identify a decision maker's best response to situations involving move and countermove. As Nobel Prize winner Thomas Shelling noted: "We may wish to understand how participants actually do conduct themselves in conflict situations; an understanding of the 'correct' play may give us a bench mark for the study of actual behavior." The concise and axiomatic approach to the material presented in this textbook is easily accessible to students with a background in the principles of microeconomics and college mathematics. The selection and organizations of topics makes the textbook appropriate for use in a wide range of curricula by students with different backgrounds.
Contents
PREFACE
1 INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
Introduction
Strategic behavior
Short history of game theory
Lexicon of game theory
Rational versus actual behavior
Practice Exercises
PART I: STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
2 COALITION GAMES
Introduction
Prisoner's dilemma
The extensive form
The normal form
Nash equilibrium
Shortcut for finding-pure strategy Nash equilibria
Determinants of business collusion
Number of firms with similar interests
Firm size relative to the industry
Visibility
Practice Exercises
3 STRATEGIC MOVES AND DETERRING DEFECTION
Introduction
Strategic moves
Deterring defection
Contracts
Reputation
Cutting off communications
Preventing retreat
Brinksmanship
Incrementalism
Teamwork
Agents
Practice exercises
4 COMPETITION GAMES
Introduction
Strictly-dominant strategies
Weakly-dominant strategies
Iterated elimination of dominated strategies
Three-player games
Non-dominant strategies
Maximin (secure) strategy
Practice exercises
5 COORD
