資本と共謀：途上国の経済成長を阻む政治的要因 Capital and Collusion : The Political Logic of Global Economic Development

資本と共謀：途上国の経済成長を阻む政治的要因<br>Capital and Collusion : The Political Logic of Global Economic Development

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資本と共謀：途上国の経済成長を阻む政治的要因
Capital and Collusion : The Political Logic of Global Economic Development

Root, Hilton L.

ウェブストア価格 ¥8,283（本体¥7,530）
Princeton University Press（2016/06発売）
外貨定価 US$ 37.00
ポイント 75pt

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製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 346 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9780691171180
DDC分類 338.90091724

Full Description

Why does capital formation often fail to occur in developing countries? Capital and Collusion explores the political incentives that either foster growth or steal nations' growth prospects. Hilton Root examines the frontier between risk and uncertainty, analyzing the forces driving development in both developed and undeveloped regions. In the former, he argues, institutions reduce everyday economic risks to levels low enough to make people receptive to opportunities for profit, stimulating developments in technology and science. Not so in developing countries. There, institutions that specialize in sharing risk are scarce. Money hides under mattresses and in teapots, creating a gap between a poor nation's savings and its investment. As a consequence, the developing world faces a growing disconnect between the value of its resources and the availability of finance. What are the remedies for eliminating this disparity? Root shows us how to close the growing wealth gap among nations by building institutions that convert uncertainty into risk.
Comparing China to India, Latin America to East Asia, and contemporary to historical cases, he offers lessons that can help the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to tackle the political incentives that are the source of poor governance in developing nations.

Tables and Figures ix PART I: Analytical Perspectives 1 CHAPTER ONE: Risk, Uncertainty, and Social Progress 3 CHAPTER TWO: Social Foundations of Policy Credibility 17 CHAPTER THREE: Politics and Economic Structure: The Economic Logic of Autocracy 35 CHAPTER FOUR: An Amazing Economy of Information: The Financial System 48 PART II: Regional and National Complexity 57 CHAPTER FIVE: Closing the Social Productivity Gap in East Asia 59 CHAPTER SIX: The Price of Exclusion: Latin America's Explosive Debt 89 CHAPTER SEVEN: Why Not India?New Century, New Country 114 CHAPTER EIGHT: Pakistan on the Edge 157 CHAPTER NINE: China's Capitalist Dream: Between Hierarchy and Market 187 PART III: Conclusion 219 CHAPTER TEN: Mobilizing the State as Public Risk Manager 221 CONCLUSION: Uncertainty, Competition, and Collusion in Early Capital Accumulation 246 Acknowledgments 249 Appendix 1 Data Sources 251 Appendix 2 Variables 252 Notes 253 References 307 Index 327