Full Description
Under the Human Rights Act, British courts are for the first time empowered to review primary legislation for compliance with a codified set of fundamental rights. In this book, Aileen Kavanagh argues that the HRA gives judges strong powers of constitutional review, similar to those exercised by the courts under an entrenched Bill of Rights. The aim of the book is to subject the leading case-law under the HRA to critical scrutiny, whilst remaining sensitive to the deeper constitutional, political and theoretical questions which underpin it. Such questions include the idea of judicial deference, the constitutional status of the HRA, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the constitutional division of labour between Parliament and the courts. The book closes with a sustained defence of the legitimacy of constitutional review in a democracy, thus providing a powerful rejoinder to those who are sceptical about judicial power under the HRA.
Contents
1. Introduction; Part I. Questions of Interpretation: 2. Sections 3 and 4 HRA: the early case-law; 3. Interpretation after Ghaidan v. Mendoza; 4. Section 3(1) as a strong presumption of statutory interpretation; 5. The interplay between s.3 and s.4; 6. The duty of the courts under s.2(1); Part II. Questions of Deference: 7. The nature and grounds of judicial deference; 8. Deference in particular contexts; 9. Proportionality and deference under the Human Rights Act; Part III. Questions of Constitutional Status and Legitimacy: 10. The nature and status of the HRA; 11. Parliamentary sovereignty and the HRA; 12. Justifying constitutional review; 13. Constitutional review and participatory democracy; 14. Conclusion.
