An Ownership Theory of the Trade Union

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An Ownership Theory of the Trade Union

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 170 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9780520369689
  • DDC分類 331.8801

Full Description

An Ownership Theory of the Trade Union explores the economic theories behind trade union behavior, analyzing the historical struggle to define what unions maximize. Despite various theories suggesting unions aim to maximize wage rates, membership benefits, or organizational survival, a consistent economic model for unions has been elusive. The book critiques previous models, highlighting the need for an ownership-based approach to better explain unions' objectives. By examining the structure of property rights within unions, the book argues that a theory of union behavior must take into account the specific rights and incentives facing union members and leaders.

The author introduces two contrasting models: one assuming private-property rights that allow union members to share in the capital value of future union gains, and another based on nonproprietary assumptions where members lack individual claims to union rents. These models offer differing predictions for union policies on wages, benefits, and membership, influenced by whether union members have a vested interest in the union's capitalized wealth. The book asserts that analyzing the union's structure of property rights provides valuable insights into the practical incentives that drive union policies, which are often inconsistent with wealth-maximization assumptions in traditional economic models.

The book's chapters address specific elements of union organization, including the role of union leaders, monitoring costs, and membership pricing and rationing. Through this analysis, it reveals how the ownership structure within unions shapes their economic decisions, contrasting proprietary and nonproprietary models in terms of membership access, wage policies, and managerial discretion. By focusing on property rights and institutional incentives, An Ownership Theory of the Trade Union aims to offer a more precise and testable model of union behavior, aligning it more closely with broader economic theories.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1980.