官僚制の科学的研究:最新のアプローチ<br>Politics, Policy, and Organizations : Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy

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官僚制の科学的研究:最新のアプローチ
Politics, Policy, and Organizations : Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 304 p.
  • 言語 ENG,ENG
  • 商品コード 9780472113170
  • DDC分類 351

基本説明

Drawing on rational choice approaches, computationally intensive data and modeling techniques, and systematic empirical inquiry.

Full Description


Essays on theory building and empirical theory testing in the study of bureaucracy and public policy Politics, Policy, and Organizations bridges the gap between studies of public administration and the broader field of political science by highlighting the vital role that bureaucracies play in shaping public policy. With this landmark volume, leading scholars develop a new organizations approach to the study of public bureaucracy, linking bureaucratic choice to public policy-making through scientific inquiry. Politics, Policy, and Organizations goes beyond the traditional, passive view of administrative agencies to describe the vital role of bureaucratic organizations in a functioning democracy. By placing the agencies front and center, the authors make a powerful case that bureaucracy is really a fourth branch of government - albeit one that generally goes unnoticed except in times of emergency or deep national division. This groundbreaking work provides a new and more accurate guide to the interactions of bureaucracies with other political institutions and the public at large. This work is essential for students and scholars in the field of public policy and public administration.

Table of Contents

Preface                                            vii
The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy: An 1 (22)
Overview
Kenneth J. Meier
George A. Krause
Part 1. Theory
Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a 23 (18)
Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Agency
Timing, with Applications to the FDA
Daniel P. Carpenter
Agency Risk Propensities Involving the 41 (32)
Demand for Bureaucratic Discretion
George A. Krause
Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and 73 (31)
Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems
Thomas H. Hammond
The Benefits of Agency Policy-making: 104(29)
Perspectives from Positive Theory
David B. Spence
Part 2. Methodological Technology
Donut Shops, Speed Traps, and Paperwork: 133(27)
Supervision and the Allocation of Time to
Bureaucratic Tasks
John Brehm
Scott Gates
Brad Gomez
Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, 160(27)
and Punishment in the Design of
Bureaucratic Performance
Andrew B. Whitford
Part 3. Empirical Studies
Consensual Rule Making and the Time It 187(20)
Takes to Develop Rules
Steven J. Balla
John R. Wright
Why It Matters Whether State Bureaucrats as 207(26)
Opposed to Federal Bureaucrats Administer
Federal Programs
Lael R. Keiser
Structural Choice and Political Control of 233(26)
Bureaucracy: Updating Federal Credit
Programs
Kevin Corder
Administrative Structure and Social 259(17)
Democratic Results: The Case of Education
Kevin B. Smith
Bureaucratic Discretion and Regulatory 276(16)
Success without Enforcement
Michael J. Licari
Conclusion: An Agenda for the Scientific Study 292(17)
of Bureaucracy
Kenneth J. Meier
George A. Krause
References 309(32)
Contributors 341(2)
Author Index 343(6)
Subject Index 349