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Full Description
The election of populist politicians in recent years seems to challenge the commitment to democracy, if not its ideal. This book argues that majority rule is not the problem; rather, the institutions that stabilize majorities are responsible for the suppression of minority interests. Despite the popular notion that social choice instability (or "cycling") makes it impossible for majorities to make sound legislation, Yuhui Li argues that the best part of democracy is not the large number of people on the winning side; it is that the winners can be easily divided and realigned with the losers in the cycling process. He shows that minorities' bargaining power depends on their ability to exploit division within the winning coalition and induce its members to defect, an institutionalized uncertainty that is missing in one-party authoritarian systems.
Dividing the Rulers theorizes why such division within the majority is important and what kind of institutional features can help a democratic system maintain such division, which is crucial in preventing the "tyranny of the majority." These institutional solutions point to a direction of institutional reform that academics, politicians, and voters should collectively pursue.
Contents
ONE Introduction
TWO Distributive Problems under Majority Rule and the Scholarly Solutions
THREE The Inverse Relationship between Majority Unity and Minority Protection
FOUR An Experimental Approach to Simulating the Defection Cost Effect
FIVE Exploring the Defection Cost Argument with Observational Data
SIX Is There Such a Thing as a Majority Group? A Theory of Majority Splitting under Proportional Systems
SEVEN Verifying the Electoral System Effect on Splitting Majorities
EIGHT Conclusion
References
Index
