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基本説明
New in softcover. Hardcover was published in 2005.Explicitly models managers’ preferences and treats them as economic agents of the principal, who acts on behalf of the firm’s owners. Provides an extensive examination of fundamental concepts in the economic analysis of incentives, with particular emphasis on the impact of the performance measurement system characteristics on the value of the firm.
Full Description
This book provides an integrated, technical exposition of key concepts in agency theory, with particular emphasis on analyses of the economic consequences of the characteristics of contractible performance measures, such as accounting reports. It is not a survey of the literature, but provides a succinct source for learning the fundamentals of the economics of incentives. While there is an emphasis on information issues of interest to accounting researchers, it is also relevant to researchers in economics, finance, management science, and other disciplines who are interested in the economics of management incentives.
Contents
to Performance Evaluation.- Performance Evaluation in Single-Period/Single-Agent Settings.- Optimal Contracts.- Ex Post Performance Measures.- Linear Contracts.- Multiple Tasks and Multiple Performance Measures.- Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers as Performance Measures.- Private Agent Information and Renegotiation in Single-Period/Single-Agent Settings.- Post-Contract, Pre-Decision Information.- Pre-Contract Information — Uninformed Principal Moves First.- Intra-Period Contract Renegotiation.- Contracting in Multi-period/Single-agent Settings.- Multi-Period Contracts with Full Commitment and Independent Periods.- Timing and Correlation of Reports in a Multi-Period LEN Model.- Full Commitment Contracts with Interdependent Periods.- Inter-Period Contract Renegotiation.- Contracting with Multiple Agents in Single-period Settings.- Contracting with Multiple Productive Agents.- Contracting with a Productive Agent and a Monitor.
