Epistemic Duties : New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)

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Epistemic Duties : New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge Studies in Epistemology)

McCain, Kevin (EDT)/ Stapleford, Scott (EDT)

ウェブストア価格 ¥11,554（本体¥10,504）
Routledge（2022/04発売）
外貨定価 US$ 56.99
ポイント 105pt

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製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 302 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9780367562724
DDC分類 121.6

Full Description

There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

Chapter 14 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

Introductory Note

Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford

Part I: The Nature of Epistemic Duty

1 Epistemic Duty, Justified Belief, and Voluntary Control

Matthias Steup

2 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties are not Epistemic Duties

Miriam Schleifer McCormick

3 Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Luis Oliveira

4 Epistemic Tension and Epistemic Duty: A Rossian Account

Mark T. Nelson

5 Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will

Robert Audi

6 We Are Like American Robins

Ema Sullivan-Bissett

Part II: Epistemic Duties of Individuals

7 Bound by the Evidence

Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain

8 Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias

Lindsay Rettler and Bradley Rettler

9 Robust Justification

Jonathan Matheson

10 Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect

Anthony Robert Booth

11 Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and Epistemic Duty

Sharon Ryan

12 On What We Should Believe (And When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe)

Clayton Littlejohn

13 The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought

Anne Meylan

Part III: Social Epistemic Duties

14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief

Rik Peels

15 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief

Rebecca Wallbank and Andrew Reisner

16 When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates?

Lisa Bortolotti and Sophie Stammers

17 Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism

Scott Aikin

18 Epistemic Duties Regarding Others

Jennifer Lackey