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基本説明
The book explores how institutional rules are constantly re-negotiated and may lead to a power-shift between the concerned actors. It particularly shows how the European Parliament has been able to shift the power balance in its own favour.
Full Description
With each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, alternatively, to spell out all aspects of this decision in legislation proper. The reasons why to delegate have been of prime interest to political science. The debate has concentrated on principal-agent theory to explain why politicians delegate decision-making to bureaucrats, to independent regulatory agencies, and to others actors and how to control these agents. By contrast, Changing Rules of Delegation focuses on these questions: Which actors are empowered by delegation? Are executive actors empowered over legislative actors? How do legislative actors react to the loss of power? What opportunities are there to change the institutional rules governing delegation in order to (re)gain institutional power and, with it influence over policy outcomes? The authors analyze the conditions and processes of change of the rules that delegate decision-making power to the Commission's implementing powers under comitology. Focusing on the role of the European Parliament the authors explain why the Commission, the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, delegated decision-making to the Commission. If they chose delegation, they still have to determine under which institutional rule comitology should operate. These rules, too, distribute power unequally among actors and therefore raise the question of how they came about in the first place and whether and how the "losers" of a rule change seek to alter the rules at a later point in time.
Contents
Introduction ; 1. European Legislation and Comitology: The Development of the Comitology System ; 2. Theory and Hypotheses ; 3. Changing the Rules of Comitology: More Competences for the Parliament ; 4. Delegation Under the Lisbon Treaty ; 5. Patterns and Trends In European Legislation and Delegation ; 6. The Impact of Codecision on Comitology ; 7. The Impact of the 1999 Comitology Decision ; 8. Conclusion ; References ; Appendix 1 The Data: Sources And Classification ; Appendix 2 Directory Codes ; Appendix 3 The Number of Laws Adopted In Policy Areas Per 5 Years ; Appendix 4 The Average Number of Laws In Force In Policy Area Per 5 Years ; Appendix 5 Directives and Regulations by Author Institution and Legal Basis
