- ホーム
- > 洋書
- > 英文書
- > Philosophy
基本説明
This volume presents new work by leading philosophers on a wide range of topics in social epistemology, such as the nature of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, and the social genealogy of the concept of knowledge.
Full Description
The idea of approaching epistemological concerns from a social perspective is relatively new. For much of its history the epistemological enterprise -- and arguably philosophy more generally -- has been cast along egocentric lines. Where a non-egocentric approach has been taken, as in the recent work of naturalist epistemologists, the focus has been on individuals interacting with their environment rather than on the significance of social interaction for an understanding of the nature and value of knowledge.
The fifteen new essays presented in this volume aim to show the fertility and variety of social epistemology and to set the agenda for future research. They examine not only the well-established topic of testimony, but also newer topics such as disagreement, comprehension, the norm of trust, epistemic value, and the epistemology of silence. Several contributors discuss metaphilosophical issues to do with the nature of social epistemology and what it can contribute to epistemology more generally. Social Epistemology will be essential reading for anyone interested in this fast-growing area of philosophy.
Contents
Introduction ; Analytical Table of Contents ; 1. Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology ; 2. Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically About Social Knowledge ; 3. Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time ; 4. On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig ; 5. The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist ; 6. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism ; 7. Norms of Trust ; 8. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension ; 9. Knowing From Being Told ; 10. Can A Priori Entitlement Be Preserved By Testimony? ; 11. The Assurance View of Testimony ; 12. The Epistemology of Silence ; 13. Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement ; 14. The Epistemology of Disagreement ; 15. A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance
