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Full Description
Aristotle offers a searing rejection of Plato's commitment to a Form of the Good; core among his complaints is that goodness is not univocal, that is, that there is no single essence-specifying account of goodness covering all the many varieties of goodness there are. Aristotle's anti-Platonic arguments have been variously received: many of his readers regard them as wholly successful while many others maintain they are abject failures. This volume reconstructs and assesses these arguments afresh and asks a simple question: if they are sound, what is left for Aristotle? In particular, what principles does he have to vouchsafe the commensurability of the good things he himself regards as commensurable?
Contents
Preface
1: A View of a View of the Good
2: Two Views of a View of a View of the Good
3: A Series of Goods
4: Goodness Across the Categories
5: The Diversity of Sciences
6: Goodness Itself
7: Intrinsic Goods Alone: A Platonic Riposte
8: Normative Considerations Reintroduced
9: Good, Bad, Better, Worse
10: Goodness qua Goodness: A Concluding Scientific Postscript?
Bibliography