Compassionate Moral Realism

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Compassionate Moral Realism

Marshall, Colin

ウェブストア価格 ¥21,114（本体¥19,195）
Oxford University Press（2018/06発売）
外貨定価 UK£ 69.00
ポイント 191pt

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製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 270 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9780198809685
DDC分類 170

Full Description

Colin Marshall offers a ground-up defense of objective morality, drawing inspiration from a wide range of philosophers, including John Locke, Arthur Schopenhauer, Iris Murdoch, Nel Noddings, and David Lewis. Marshall's core claim is compassion is our capacity to perceive other creatures' pains, pleasures, and desires. Non-compassionate people are therefore perceptually lacking, regardless of how much factual knowledge they might have. Marshall argues that people who do have this form of compassion thereby fit a familiar paradigm of moral goodness. His argument involves the identification of an epistemic good which Marshall dubs "being in touch". To be in touch with some property of a thing requires experiencing it in a way that reveals that property - that is, experiencing it as it is in itself. Only compassion, Marshall argues, lets us be in touch with others' motivational mental properties.

This conclusion about compassion has two important metaethical consequences. First, it generates an answer to the question "Why be moral?", which has been a central philosophical concern since Plato. Second, it provides the keystone for a novel form of moral realism. This form of moral realism has a distinctive set of virtues: it is anti-relativist, naturalist, and able to identify a necessary connection between moral representation and motivation. The view also implies that there is an epistemic asymmetry between virtuous and vicious agents, according to which only morally good people can fully face reality.

Introduction
PART 1: THE CORE ARGUMENT
1: "Why be Moral?" and Epistemic Goods
2: Locke and Compassion
3: Being in Touch
4: Compassion and Being in Touch
PART 2: AN ANSWER TO "WHY BE MORAL?"
5: Beyond the Present
6: Pleasure and Desires
7: Combination and Comparison
8: The Scope of Compassion and Impartiality
9: The Hardest Cases
10: So what?
PART 3: MORAL REALISM
11: Criteria for Moral Realism
12: The Truth that Pain is Bad
13: Representing and Caring that Pain is Bad
14: Knowing that Pain is Bad
15: Summary and Prospects for Extension
Appendix A: Affect and Well-Functioning Agents
Appendix B: Body and Mind
Appendix C: The Content of Pain