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基本説明
New in paperback. Hardcover was published in 2007. Explores a form of injustice which has so far been largely ignored in English-language philosophy: epistemic injustice - that is to say, a wrong suffered in one's capacity as a knower.
Full Description
In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice.
The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.
Contents
Preface ; Introduction ; 1. Testimonial Injustice ; 2. Prejudice In The Credibility Economy ; 3. Towards A Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony ; 4. The Virtue of Testimonial Justice ; 5. The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice ; 6. Original Significances: The Wrong Revisited ; 7. Hermeneutical Injustice ; Conclusion ; Index
