The Beam and the Mote : On Blame, Standing, and Normativity

著者名：Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper

Oxford University Press（2023/10/20発売）

• 言語：ENG
• ISBN：9780197544594
• eISBN：9780197544617

Description

"Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye" says the Bible. In other words: there is something problematic about one person blaming another, when the blamer's faults are even greater.Many believe that even if one has done something blameworthy, one can dismiss blame when coming from a hypocritical blamer. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen examines the nature and ethics of standingless, hypocritical blame. It argues that hypocrites lack standing to blame in virtue of their lack of commitment to the norms to which they appeal in their blame; that hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrong because it involves treating the blamee as an inferior; and that there are many other sources of lacking standing to blame than hypocrisy, e.g., complicity. Lippert-Rasmussen extrapolates these analyses to other moral responses, notably praising and forgiving. So far, philosophers interested in standing have focused narrowly on blaming, but many other moral responses require standing as well. Indeed, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that considerations about standing apply to illocutionary acts not involving appeals to moral norms, e.g., non-moral encouragements and epistemic blame. In closing, Lippert-Rasmussen uses insights related to the idea of standing as a basis for making a grand claim about how part of morality is interpersonal in a sense often ignored in discussions of mainstream first-order moral theories, and to elucidate the nature of the moral wrong involved in relying on negative statistical generalizations about certain groups of people.

Table of Contents

AcknowledgementsIntroduction1. Topic and main aims2. Structure3. SignificanceChapter 1: Hypocritical blame1. Introduction2. When is blame hypocritical?2.1 The blaming condition2.2 The incoherence condition2.3 The no-self-blame condition2.4 The no-justification condition2.5 Summary3. Standing to blame and its denial4. Other accounts of what it is to dismiss blame on grounds of the hypocrite's lack of standing5. ConclusionChapter 2: Complications and defeaters of standing1. Introduction2. Private blame3. Self-blame4. Third-person blame5. Degrees of blame and degrees of standing6. Skepticism about standing to blame7. Why does hypocrisy undermine standing to blame?8. ConclusionChapter 3: What, if anything, makes hypocritical blame morally wrong?1. Introduction2. Lack of desert3. Lack of commitment4. Wrong attention5. Transgression of moral authority6. Failure of reciprocity7. Moral community8. Implying falsehoods9. A clash with moral equality10. ConclusionChapter 4: Other ways of not having standing to blame1. Introduction2. Tu quoque3. Complicity4. None of your business5. "You don't know what it's like"6. "You don't accept that principle yourself"7. ConclusionChapter 5: Praising1. Introduction2. What is praising?3. Standing to praise4. Hypocritical praise5. The wrongfulness of hypocritical praise6. Other forms of standingless praise7. Standing to prame8. ConclusionChapter 6: Forgiving1. Introduction2. What is it to forgive?3. Dismissing forgiveness as standingless4. Hypocritical forgiving5. What undermines standing to forgive?6. The wrongfulness of hypocritical forgiveness7. Other ways in which forgiving can be standingless8. Fromtaking9. Conclusion10. Appendix: Forgiving and standing to apologizeChapter 7: Morality, normativity, and standing1. Introduction2. Encouraging3. Epistemic blame4. Consequentialism, deontology, and the interpersonal nature of holding accountable5. Standing and moral encroachment6. ConclusionBibliography Index