Description
Global inequalities and our social identities shape who we are, who we can be online, and what we know. From social media to search engines to Wikipedia, the internet is thoroughly embedded in how we produce, find, and share knowledge around the world. Who Should We Be Online? examines the challenges of the online world using numerous epistemological approaches. Tackling problems of online content moderation, fake news, and hoaxes, Frost-Arnold locates the role that sexism, racism, and other forms of oppression play in creating and sharing knowledge online.Timely and interdisciplinary, Who Should We Be Online? weaves together internet studies scholarship from across the humanities, social sciences, and computer science. Frost-Arnold recognizes that the internet can both fuel ignorance and misinformation and simultaneously offer knowledge to marginalized groups and activists. Presenting case studies of moderators, imposters, and other internet personas, Frost-Arnold explains the problems with our current internet ecosystem and imagines a more just online future. Who Should We Be Online? argues for a social epistemology that values truth and objectivity, while recognizing that inequalities shape our collective ability to attain these goals. Frost-Arnold proposes numerous suggestions and reform strategies to make the internet more conducive to knowledge production and sharing.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments Chapter 1: Introduction 1. Frameworks for social epistemology of the internet1.1. The situated knowledge thesis1.2. Feminist accounts of objectivity1.3. Veritistic systems-oriented social epistemology1.4. Epistemologies of ignorance1.5. Virtue epistemology1.6. Epistemic injustice2. Chapter summariesChapter 2: Moderators 1. What is online content moderation?2. Varieties of moderation and censorship debates3. The epistemic challenges of moderation4. The virtues of moderators5. Constraints on moderators6. Commercial content moderation, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic dumping7. Algorithms to the rescue?Chapter 3: Imposters & Tricksters 1. Objectivity and truth1.1. Objectivity and truth in feminist and veritistic epistemology1.2. Objectivity, truth, and trust2. Imposters: Undermining objectivity and truth3. The need for trustworthiness3.1. Trust and authenticity3.2. Practical wisdom and trustworthiness4. Tricksters: Resisting oppression4.1. The epistemic benefits of betrayal4.2. Internet tricksters4.3. Changing epistemic landscapes and trickery4.4. Who should we be online?Chapter 4: Fakers 1. What is fake news?2. Causes of the fake news problem2.1. Cognitive/psychological2.2. Technological affordances/design features2.3. Social causes3. The epistemic damage of fake news3.1. Fake news and false belief3.2. Fake news and distrust4. Fake news and white ignorance5. Fake news, objectivity, and neutrality6. ConclusionChapter 5: Lurkers 1. The internet as a medium for unlearning ignorance2. What is lurking?3. The epistemic benefits of lurking4. Epistemic limitations of lurking5. Harmful modes of interaction: Ontological expansiveness6. A virtue epistemology for lurking and online engagement6.1. Virtues relevant to lurking and engagement6.2. The importance of practical wisdom7. Applying the virtue epistemology of lurking8. Objections and repliesChapter 6: Conclusion Appendix: Internet Research Ethics for Philosophers: Privacy, Positionality, and Power1. Purpose of this appendix2. Respecting privacy2.1. Complications for the 'public data' presumption2.2. Alternatives to simply quoting material one can access online3. Protecting the researcher in an environment of online harassment4. Avoiding epistemic appropriation5. Cultivating a "traitorous identity" as a researcherReferences Index
