Description
This book features original essays by leading epistemologists that address questions related to epistemic dilemmas from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles.
It seems plausible that there can be "no win" moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? The contributors to this volume cover a wide variety of positions on epistemic dilemmas. The coverage ranges from discussions of the nature of epistemic dilemmas to arguments that there are no such things to suggestions for how to resolve (or at least live with) epistemic dilemmas to proposals for how thinking about epistemic dilemmas can be used to inform theorizing in other areas of epistemology.
Epistemic Dilemmas will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in epistemology working on the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment.
Table of Contents
Introductory Note
Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford and Matthias Steup
Part I: What are Epistemic Dilemmas? Do they exist?
1. Rational Dilemmas and their Place in the Bigger Picture
Graham Priest
2. Higher-Order Evidence and the Normativity of Logic
Mattias Skipper
3. Collateral Conflicts and Epistemic Norms
J. Adam Carter
4. Epistemic Dilemma and Epistemic Conflict
Verena Wagner
5. Epistemic Dilemmas, Epistemic Quasi-Dilemmas, and Quasi-Epistemic Dilemmas
Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain
6. Defeaters, Higher-Order Evidence, and Epistemic Dilemmas
Matthias Steup
7. Scepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas
Mona Simion
8. When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Grounds of Rational Withholding
A.K. Flowerree
9. Epistemic Dilemmas Denied
Earl Conee
Part II: No Easy Way Out? Facing Epistemic Dilemmas
10. Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas
David Christensen
11. Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact
Eyal Tal and Paul Silva Jr.
12. Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Dispositions
Katherine Puddifoot
13. Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism
Liz Jackson
14. Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain
Nick Leonard and Fabrizio Cariani
15. Who’s Afraid of Epistemic Dilemmas?
Nick Hughes
