Description
A familiar trope of cognitive science, linguistics, and the philosophy of psychology over the past forty or so years has been the idea of the mind as a modular system-that is, one consisting of functionally specialized subsystems responsible for processing different classes of input, or handling specific cognitive tasks like vision, language, logic, music, and so on. However, one of the major achievements of neuroscience has been the discovery that the brain has incredible powers of renewal and reorganization. This "neuroplasticity," in its various forms, has challenged many of the orthodox conceptions of the mind which originally led cognitive scientists to postulate hardwired mental modules.This book examines how such discoveries have changed the way we think about the structure of the mind. It contends that the mind is more supple than prevailing theories in cognitive science and artificial intelligence acknowledge. The book uses language as a test case. The claim that language is cognitively special has often been understood as the claim that it is underpinned by dedicated-and innate-cognitive mechanisms. Zerilli offers a fresh take on how our linguistic abilities could be domain-general: enabled by a composite of very small and redundant cognitive subsystems, few if any of which are likely to be specialized for language. In arguing for this position, however, the book takes seriously various cases suggesting that language dissociates from other cognitive faculties.Accessibly written, The Adaptable Mind is a fascinating account of neuroplasticity, neural reuse, the modularity of mind, the evolution of language, and faculty psychology.
Table of Contents
PrefaceAcknowledgements1 Setting the scene2 Aspects of neuroplasticity2.1 SCOPE OF CHAPTER2.2 THE NATURE OF PLASTIC CHANGES IN THE BRAIN2.2.1 Definition2.2.2 Synaptic plasticity2.3 NEUROPLASTIC RECOVERY DURING DEVELOPMENT2.4 CORTICAL MAP PLASTICITY2.4.1 Intramodal plasticity2.4.2 Crossmodal plasticity2.4.3 Supramodal (or "metamodal") organization2.5 SUMMARY3 Neural reuse and recycling3.1 WHAT IS NEURAL REUSE?3.2 THE MASSIVE REDEPLOYMENT HYPOTHESIS3.3 FURTHER EVIDENCE OF NEURAL REUSE3.3.1 Computational modeling3.3.2 Biobehavioural evidence3.3.3 Final thoughts3.4 SUMMARY4 Modules reconsidered: Varieties of modularity4.1 A PIVOT TO THE NEUROSCIENCES4.2 VARIETIES OF MODULARITY4.2.1 Themes and trends4.2.2 Graph theory and network neuroscience4.2.3 Separate modifiability as the touchstone of modularity4.3 THE BRAIN MODULE4.4 SUMMARY5 Modules reconsidered: Whither modularity?5.1 DOES MODULARITY SURVIVE THE EVIDENCE OF NEURAL REUSE?5.2 CAN COMPOSITE SYSTEMS BE DISSOCIABLE?5.3 MODULAR NOTATION5.4 SUMMARY6 Are modules innate?6.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS6.2 IMPLICATIONS OF NEUROPLASTICITY6.3 SUMMARY7 The language module reconsidered7.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS7.2 DEFINING A LANGUAGE MODULE7.2.1 The meaning of linguistic specialization7.2.2 The domain of language clarified7.2.3 Examples of elementary linguistic units7.3 IS THERE A LANGUAGE MODULE?7.4 IS LANGUAGE INNATE?7.5 ACCOUNTING FOR LINGUISTIC MODULARIZATION7.6 SUMMARY8 Saving faculty psychology: Debunking the argument from multiple realization8.1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY8.2 MULTIPLE REALIZATION REVISITED8.2.1 Preliminary remarks8.2.2 Empirical arguments for multiple realization8.2.2.1 Neuroplasticity8.2.2.2 Convergent evolution8.2.3 A conspectus of recent arguments against multiple realization8.2.3.1 Outline of arguments8.2.3.2 The argument from comparative psychology8.2.3.3 The argument from grains8.2.3.4 The argument from context8.2.4 Conclusion8.3 NEW LOOK FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY8.4 SUMMARY9 Summing upReferencesIndex
