Description
When philosophers try to understand the nature of knowledge, they have to confront the Gettier problem. This problem, set out in Edmund Gettier's famous paper of 1963, has yet to be solved, and has challenged our best attempts to define what knowledge is. This volume offers an organised sequence of accessible and distinctive chapters explaining the history of debate surrounding Gettier's challenge, and where that debate should take us next. The chapters describe and evaluate a wide range of ideas about knowledge that have been sparked by philosophical engagements with the Gettier problem, including such phenomena as fallibility, reasoning, evidence, reliability, truth-tracking, context, luck, intellectual virtue, wisdom, conceptual analysis, intuition, experimental philosophy, and explication. The result is an authoritative survey of fifty-plus years of epistemological research - along with provocative ideas for future research – into the nature of knowledge.
Table of Contents
Introduction: meet the Gettier problem Stephen Hetherington; 1. The Gettier problem and fallibilism Charity Anderson; 2. Epistemic closure and post-Gettier epistemology of reasoning Claudio de Almeida; 3. Gettier cases and evidence Clayton Littlejohn; 4. The Gettier problem and externalism Rodrigo Borges; 5. The Gettier problem and context Delia Belleri and Annalisa Coliva; 6. The Gettier problem and epistemic luck Duncan Pritchard; 7. The sensitivity response to the Gettier problem Kelly Becker; 8. The Gettier problem and intellectual virtue John Greco; 9. Knowledge and wisdom Ernest Sosa; 10. The Gettier problem and the program of analysis Patrick Rysiew; 11. Intuition in the Gettier problem Elijah Chudnoff; 12. Experimental epistemology and 'Gettier' cases John Turri; 13. The Gettier problem's explicability problem Stephen Hetherington.
