Description
From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Victory" in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated.In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defense ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.
Table of Contents
1. Prologue2. A Case to Answer?3. Jumping to the ConclusionDeciphering the CodeArmed Forces are DifferentSome Wars are DifferentWarfare in a State of EvolutionSolders Will Die and They Will Cause Death4. Inside the Ministry of DefenceA Walk through the MoDSeeing One of the ChiefsThe Motivations of the ActorsOther Influences5. The Tribes and The SystemDefence PoliticiansCivil Servants in the MoDThe First and Second Permanent SecretariesThe Military in the MoDDifferent World ViewsThe Royal NavyThe Royal Air ForceThe British Army Officers are Similar but DifferentOfficers Behaving BadlyThe Culture of the MoD Did it Matter?6. Setting the Conditions for Success and FailureThe Weinberger DoctrineThe Powell DoctrineNo Useable DoctrineBlair's DoctrineProblems for the MilitaryWhat did the Changes Mean for the UK?7. A Long Peace is ShatteredThe Twin TowersWar Comes to Afghanistan in 2001Hunting al-QaidaISAFA Limited Success9. The War on Terror Opens in Iraq in 2003Aftermath of the InvasionHard FightingOperation Salamanca/Sinbad and The DealOut of Step10. Battle Returns to Afghanistan in 2006NATO Expands its RoleUnified CommandHelmandThe Taliban AttackWhy Helmand?11. Emerging Criticism and Flawed StrategiesA Capable ArmySomeone Was to BlameStrategyGood StrategyContradictions in UK StrategiesHow were these Strategic Inconsistencies Left Unchecked?12. Making Military DecisionsSorting Out the Levels of Decision-makingThe Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO)High-level Decision-making in Main BuildingThe Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)Orphaned Commanders13. The ChiefsThe Development of the Chiefs of Staff SystemSelection of a Service ChiefMilitary Chiefs in a Political WorldSelection of the Chief of the Defence StaffThe Chief of the Defence StaffPreparation for the Top JobThe Chiefs of the Defence Staff in ActionThe Chief of the Defence Staff as the War CommanderConclusion14. The AftermathWhy Did it Go Wrong?How Things Could ImproveWho is to be in Charge and How should Decisions be Taken?Choosing and Training the Chief15. Fit for the Future?Annex 1. Events and Principal UK Defence PersonalitiesAnnex 2. Principal UK Field CommandersAnnex 3. Maps of Iraq and AfghanistanAnnex 4. Summary of Eight Contradictions in UK StrategyAnnex 5. List of Titles, Acronyms and Ranks
