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基本説明
Rests on the realization that the everyday behavior of a cat (Max in this case, but other animals too, including humans) should be understood through a new approach, namely methodological dualism.
Full Description
To understand a cat: methodology and philosophy rests on the realization that the everyday behavior of a cat (but other animals too) should be understood through a new approach, namely methodological dualism. It appeals to mechanistic explanation models and to mentalistic explanation models. It puts up the methodological idea that these models have to be combined in one theoretical structure according to the scientific game-rules. This approach shows that specific mentalistic explanations are generated from explanation models or schemes, which meet the demands of the scientific games-rules; and it proposes a new theoretical structure called the multi-explanation theory to generate particular theories, which provide us with efficient explanations for behavioral phenomena. The book delves deep into anthropomorphism, and the complex question of whether a cat has consciousness and free will, and examines the intricate relations of the mental, the computational, and the neurophysiological.(Series A)
Contents
1. Preface; 2. Chapter 1. 'Scientification': Placing anecdotes and anthropomorphism under the umbrella of science as the first step; 3. 1.1 An ambush for a night moth; 4. 1.2 Some methodological thoughts: Anthropomorphism and anecdotes; 5. 1.2.1 Scientific observation and anecdotes; 6. 1.2.2 Scientific explanation and anthropomorphism; 7. 1.2.3 A methodological proposal: 'Equal hypotheses testing'; 8. 1.2.4 Mechanistic explanations and mentalistic explanations; 9. Chapter 2. Anecdotes and the methodology of testing hypotheses; 10. 2.1 The living space of Max the cat; 11. 2.2 Pros and cons of observations of Max the cat; 12. 2.3 Construction and testing of hypotheses from anecdotes; 13. 2.4 Test of the hypothesis that Max ambushed the night moth for his amusement; 14. 2.5 Matching a mentalistic explanation to behavior: the "Principle of New Application"; 15. Chapter 3. Free will, consciousness, and explanation; 16. 3.1 The methodological status of indicators of private behavior; 17. 3.2 Indicators of free will in Max the cat; 18. 3.3 Discussion of indicators of free will; 19. 3.4 Indicators of free will, consciousness, and explanation; 20. Chapter 4. The structure of mentalistic theory and the reasons for its use; 21. 4.1 The structure of a theory; 22. 4.2 Why should one use a mentalistic explanation?; 23. Chapter 5. Three-stage interpretation; 24. 5.1 Three-stage interpretation and the principle of new application; 25. 5.2 Comparison of the three-stage interpretation and other approaches to an explanation for complex behavior; 26. 5.3 Cannot Max's behavior, ultimately, be explained mechanistically, as simple learning?; 27. 5.3.1 Examples of behavioral episodes explained as simple learning processes; 28. 5.3.2 Are learning processes mechanistic or mentalistic?; 29. 5.3.3 An attempt to propose mechanistic explanations for mentalistic behavioral episodes; 30. Pictures of Max the cat; 31. Chapter 6. Multi-explanation theory; 32. 6.1 An explanation model, an empirical test, and a multi-explanation theory; 33. 6.2 Examples from Max's behavior and from psychology; 34. 6.3 Three methodological problems connected to the multi-explanation theory; 35. 6.3.1 The ad hoc explanation problem; 36. 6.3.2 The inconsistency problem; 37. 6.3.3 The incomparability problem; 38. 6.4 Guidelines for the solution of the three problems; 39. 6.4.1 How to determine a match between an explanation model and a given empirical phenomenon; 40. 6.4.2 How should the explanatory units be organized?; 41. 6.4.3 Do the guidelines help solve the three problems: an ad hoc explanation, inconsistency, and comparison of theories?; 42. 6.5 Multi-explanation theory, giving an explanation, and empirical test; 43. 6.5.1 Is the multi-explanation theory tested by use of the H-D method?; 44. 6.5.2 Is the explanation offered by the multi-explanation theory similar to the explanation offered in the natural sciences?; 45. Chapter 7. Establishing multi-explanation theory (A): The mentalistic explanation scheme; 46. 7.1 A model, a mentalistic explanation scheme; 47. 7.1.1 A teleological explanation model and folk psychology; 48. 7.1.2 Teleological explanation and refutation; 49. 7.1.3 What is a suitable explanation scheme?; 50. 7.1.4 A mentalistic explanation model and scientific laws; 51. 7.2.1 "Intentional stance"; 52. 7.2.2 Functional analysis and the status of empirical generalizations in psychology; 53. Chapter 8. Establishing multi-explanation theory (B): "Methodological dualism"; 54. 8.1 Mental causality; 55. 8.2 Functionalism and multiple realizability; 56. 8.3 The computer and the process of decomposition; 57. 8.4 Reduction; 58. 8.5 Multiple realizability and decomposition - a methodological note; 59. 8.6 Consciousness; 60. Chapter 9. Methodological dualism and multi-explanation theory in the broad philosophical context; 61. 9.1 Methodological dualism, "Scientification", explanatory dualism, functionalism, and levels of explanation; 62. 9.2 Multi-explanation theory and other approaches to constructing theories; 63. 9.3 Multi-explanation theory, understanding, explanation, and emergent properties; 64. 9.3.1 Two kinds of explanation (scheme fitting, mechanism discovery) and the mosaic example; 65. 9.3.2 Emergent properties and the mosaic example; 66. References
