A Sceptical Theory of Scientific Inquiry: Problems and Their Progress (Schriftenreihe zur Philosophie Karl R. Poppers und des Kritischen Rationalismus / Series in the Philosophy of Karl R. Popper and Critical Rationalism)

Briskman, Laurence/ Shearmur, Jeremy (EDT)

Brill（2020/06発売）

• 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 192 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9789004429192
• DDC分類 149.7

Full Description

A Sceptical Theory of Scientific Inquiry: Problems and Their Progress presents a distinctive re-interpretation of Popper's 'critical rationalism', displaying the kind of spirit found at the L.S.E. before Popper's retirement. It offers an alternative to interpretations of critical rationalism which have emphasised the significance of research programmes or metaphysics (Lakatos; Nicholas Maxwell), and is closer to the approach of Jagdish Hattiangadi. Briskman gives priority to methodological argument rather than logical formalisms, and takes further his own work on creativity. In addition to offering an important contribution to the understanding of critical rationalism, the book contains interesting engagements with Michael Polanyi and the Meno Paradox. This volume also contains an introduction by the editor, which situates Briskman's work in the history of the interpretation of 'critical rationalism'.

Contents

 Editorial Note

 Editorial Introduction

 Larry Briskman: Biographical Note

 Larry Briskman's Publications

 Guide to Abbreviations

 Acknowledgements

 Introduction: Two Types of Evolution

 1 The Rationality of Science

  1.1 The 'Initial' and 'Transcendental' Strategies

  1.2 Philosophy as Explication: Critical Remarks

  1.3 Methodology - Normative or Naturalistic?

  1.4 The Two Strategies and the Naturalistic Approach

  1.5 Conclusion

 2 Scientific Method and Scientific Progress

  2.1 The Problem of the Justification of a Method (or, The Generalised Problem of Induction)

  2.2 The Generalised Problem of Induction and Popper's Theory of Method

  2.3 Three Apparent Objections to (PR")

  2.4 'Transcendentalism' and Naturalism Re-visited

  2.5 The Relation of Rationality to Choice

  2.6 A Summary of the Argument So Far

  2.7 Explaining the Success of Science

  2.8 The Method of Strengthening Demands - Further Remarks

  2.9 Conclusion

 3 Methodology and the Context of Inquiry

  3.1 The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification

  3.2 Three Crucial Distinctions

  3.3 Towards a Non-psychologistic Context of Production (I)

  3.4 Towards a Non-psychologistic Context of Production (II)

  3.5 Conclusion - Methodology as the Theory of Rational Inquiry

 4 Articulating Our Ignorance - Hopeful Scepticism and the Meno Paradox

  4.1 Some 'Popperian' Preliminaries

  4.2 Justificationism and the Problem of Diversity

  4.3 Justificationism, Scepticism, and Relativism

  4.4 Justificationism, Socratic Scepticism, and the Meno Paradox

  4.5 TDSK - A Socratic Sceptical Solution to the Meno Paradox

  4.6 Conclusion

 5 Against 'tacit knowing'

  5.1 Three Questions Concerning

  5.2 Against: 'Tacit Knowing'

  5.3 Conclusion

 6 Beyond TDSK

  6.1 The Kuhnian Objection

  6.2 The Problem of Content

  6.3 A Plausibility Argument for (D4)

  6.4 Beyond TDSK 2

 Bibliography

 Index of Names

 Index of Subjects XX