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Full Description
This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.
Contents
Preface
ContributorsI
1 Non-Evidentialist Epistemology: Introduction and Overview
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Luca Moretti
part 1: Hinge Epistemology
2 Inescapable Hinges: A Transcendental Hinge Epistemology
Luca Zanetti
3 Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism
Natalie Alana Ashton
4 Hinge Epistemology and Alethic Pluralism
Sebastiano Moruzzi
5 Hinges, Radical Skepticism, Relativism and Alethic Pluralism
Annalisa Coliva
part 2: Criticisms of Evidentialist and Non-Evidentialist Epistemology
6 Problems for Wright's Entitlement Theory
Luca Moretti
7 Epistemic Entitlement: Intellectual Desires and Epistemic Rationality
Junyeol Kim
8 Epistemic Conservatism: A Non-Evidentialist Epistemology?
Kevin McCain
9 Weak Non-Evidentialism
Tommaso Piazza
part 3: Extensions of Non-Evidentialist Epistemology
10 Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Pragmatist Stance
Anne Meylan
11 The Certainties of Delusion
Jakob Ohlhorst
12 Cornerstone Epistemology: Scepticism, Mathematics, Non-Evidentialism, Consequentualism, Pluralism
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
Index