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Description
The book is a defense of intentionalism. According to intentionalism the phenomenal character of all mental states - such as thoughts, perceptions, emotions or bodily sensations - is determined by their intentional properties, that is by their meaning. Many philosophers of mind are attracted to intentionalism because they assume that an intentional description of mental phenomena contributes to a reduction of mental properties to physical properties. This book adopts a different point of view: We can see intentionality more fruitfully as the basis for a theory that explains how various different mental states are epistemically significant for us. Once we adopt an epistemological perspective on the mind, we can formulate an intentionalist theory that not only has more explanatory force, but is also more phenomenologically adequate than accounts available so far. The book has two parts: The first half is primarily a methodological analysis of how we should and should not study intentionality and discuss intentionalism. The second half begins the positive work of developing a successful intentionalist theory based on an enriched epistemic two-dimensional semantics for mental states. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson, born 1978, studied Philosophy and Literature at the Universities of Bonn and Cologne, Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Cologne in 2007. Research stays as a Doctoral Researcher and as a Post-Doc at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Lecturer at the Philosophy Department, University of California at Davis 2007-2008. Since 2009 Research Fellow at the Emmy-Noether Research Group "Understanding and the A Priori" at the Philosophy Department, University of Cologne. Research areas: Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophical Methodology, Phenomenology
