Description
(Text)
This book analyzes the VC's role as a monitoring agent and a certifying agent in the relationship with the entrepreneur. It is focused on the impact of asymmetric information on optimal investments, learning, and exit outcomes in this context.The research results show that agency costs of the VC are time-variant, the information rent earned by the VC in a funding relationship is biased under asymmetric Information and certification by the VC in the exit phase is most important if new investors face high search and screening costs.
(Table of content)
1 Introduction2 Moral Hazard in VC FinanceIntroduction - Formal Model - Empirical Approach - Conclusion3 Learning in Funding RelationshipsIntroduction - Learning and Comprehensiveness - Frictions in the Learning Process - Formal Hypotheses - Data and Methodology - Results - Conclusion4 VCs as Intermediaries in ExitsIntroduction - Agency Cost in IPO and Trade Sale Exits - Investor Characteristics - Firm Characteristics - Sample and Methodology - Results - Conclusion5 ConclusionSummary of the Main Results - OutlookBibliography
(Text)
This book analyzes the VC's role as a monitoring agent and a certifying agent in the relationship with the entrepreneur. It is
focused on the impact of asymmetric information on optimal investments, learning, and exit outcomes in this context.
The research results show that agency costs of the VC are time-variant, the information rent earned by the VC in a
funding relationship is biased under asymmetric Information and certification by the VC in the exit phase is most important
if new investors face high search and screening costs.
