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Full Description
This book is a consideration of the differences between Aristotelian and symbolic logic (and the metaphysical assumptions they come packaged with) and the consequences these have for how we view the world. What Veatch propose is to try to exhibit with respect to several of the key logical tools and devices - propositions, inductive and deductive arguments, scientific and historical explanations, definitions, etc. - how these several instruments are differently conceived, both as to their natures and their functions, in each of these respective logics.
Contents
Introduction: the battle of the books renewed
A logic that can't say what anything is
Alternative logics: a what-logic and a relating-logic
The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not analytic truths
The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not synthetic truths
The disabilities of a relating-logic: the fallacy of inverted intentionality
The world as seen through a relating-logic
A what-logic and its supposed commitment to essences and substantial forms
Induction as conceived by a relating-logic and a what-logic
The picture of the world derived from the inductions in a relating-logic
Deductive explanation: a likely case study in surrealism?
From deductive explanation in general to historical explanation in particular
A short digression from history into ethics
Conclusion: epilogue or epitaph?
