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Full Description
The applicability of EC law of state aids to the state`s unlimited liability for Savings Banks and "Landesbanken" is controversial. Legal and political discussions following the Maastricht-II-Treaty tend to assume that liabilities have to be qualified as state aids. However, as the liabilities in question derive from public ownership, they have to be distinguished from securities for corporate debts which might be qualified as state aids under EC law. In this context the book discusses state aids to public companies and the private investor test of the EC Court of Justice. The authors question the EC Commission`s concept to quantify refinancing advantages which are supposed to be achieved by virtue of public liability.
Contents
A. Statement of the issue.- B. Institutional burden and guarantor liability as organizational concept of commercially active public institutions.- I. Financial institutions under public law in the German banking system.- II. Institutional burden and guarantor liability as structural characteristics of public commercial activity.- III. Guarantor liability and institutional burden as a consequence of the administrative organizational discretion of the state.- IV. Deposit protection systems and bank supervision in Germany.- C. Applicability of Article 92 EC Treaty.- I. The concept of subsidies.- II. Control measures of subsidy supervision.- III. Applicability of Article 92 EC Treaty to public companies.- D. Institutional burden and guarantor liability as a subsidy?.- I. Sureties or guarantees as subsidies even in the absence of an actual case of liability.- II. Guarantor liability and institutional burden as liability by virtue of organization.- III. Subsidy law and property right.- IV. Unlimited assumption of liability as common market behavior of a private investor?.- V. Institutional burden and guarantor liability as the expression of financing responsibility under corporate law.- E. Institutional burden and guarantor liability as subsidies by virtue of refinancing advantages?.- I. Presence of an economic benefit.- II. The assumption of unlimited liability as a common market form of financing for a private investor.- III. Proof and quantification of a benefit.- IV. Conclusions.- F. Actual contributions of capital as a subsidy?.- I. Differentiation between the existence of and the execution of institutional burden.- II. Actual contribution of capital in a crisis situation.- III. Continuance of institutional burden in a crisis situation.- G. Special features of the banking sector: Compatibility of subsidization "to relieve a major economic disturbance" (Art. 92,3(C)).- I. Major economic disturbance.- II. Special features of the banking sector.- H. Distortion of competition and impairment of international trade.- I. Distortion of competition.- II. Impairment of international trade.- I. Summary.- I. Institutional burden and guarantor liability as subsidies?.- II. Institutional burden and guarantor liability as subsidies by virtue of refinancing advantages?.- III. Actual contributions of capital as subsidies?.- IV. Special features of the banking sector: Compatibility of subsidization "to relieve a major economic disturbance" (Art. 92,3 (c) EC Treaty)?.
