Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)

Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)

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  • 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版/ページ数 197 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9783540669555

基本説明

Reports experimental studies and a theoretical investigation of non-cooperative bargaining games with joint production.

Full Description

The book reports experimental studies and a theoretical investigation of non-cooperative bargaining games with joint production. Such games have rarely been studied within laboratory experiments despite being more general and more natural than bargaining without production. It is shown that equity theory is a good predictor of subjects' behavior. Furthermore subjects exhibit different equity notions. One chapter addresses problems of statistical data analysis that are specific to experiments. Applying evolutionary game theory within a model of bargaining with production it is shown theoretically that altruistic preferences, which generate moderate bargaining behavior, can survive the process of evolution.

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