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Full Description
This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic.
'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science and logicians. It addresses a growing agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction - and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision and game theory. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic, computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology.
Contents
Introduction.- 1. Agency and interaction: what we are and what we do in formal epistemology; Jeffrey Helzner and Vincent F. Hendricks.- Part 1. Bayesian Epistemology: Introduction.- 2. Truth and probability; Frank P. Ramsey.- 3. Probable knowledge; Richard C. Jeffrey.- 4. Fine--grained opinion, probability and the logic of full belief; Bas C. van Fraassen.- 5. A theory of higher order probabilities; Haim Gaifman.- 6. On indeterminate probabilities; Isaac Levi.- 6. On indeterminate probabilities; Isaac Levi.- 7. Why I am not a Bayesian; Clark Glymour.- 8. A mistake in dynamic coherence arguments? Brian Skyrms.- 9. Some problems for conditionalization and reflection; Frank Arntzenius.- 10. Stopping to reflect; Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and Joseph B. Kadane.- Part II. Belief Change: Introduction.- 11. On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions; Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson.- 12. Theory contraction and base contraction unified; Sven Ove Hansson.- 13. How infallible but corrigible full belief is possible; Isaac Levi.- 14. Belief contraction in the context of the General Theory of Rational Choice; Hans Rott.- 15. A survey of ranking theory; Wolfgang Spohn.- Part III. Decision Theory: Introduction.- 16. Allais's Paradox; Leonard Savage.- 17. Decision theory without 'independence' or without 'ordering'; Teddy Seidenfeld.- 18. Ambiguity and the Bayesian paradigm; Itzhak Gilboa and Massimo Marinacci.- 19. State dependent utilities; Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and Joseph B. Kadane.- 20. Causal decision theory; James M. Joyce and Allan Gibbard.- 21. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemann.- Part IV. Logics of Knowledge and Belief: Introduction.- 22. Epistemology without knowledge and without belief; Jaakko Hintikka.- 23. Epistemic operators; Fred Dretske.- 24. Elusive knowledge; David Lewis.- 25. Knowledge and skepticism; RobertNozick.- 26. On logics of knowledge and belief; Robert Stalnaker.- 27. Sentences, belief and logical omniscience, or what does deduction tell us? Rohit Parikh.- 28. The logic of justification; Sergei Artemov.- 29. Learning theory and epistemology; Kevin T. Kelly.- 30. Some computational constraints in epistemic logic; Timothy Williamson.- Part V. Interactive Epistemology: Introduction.- 31. Convention (an excerpt); David Lewis.- 32. Three views of common understanding; Jon Barwise.- 33. The logic of public announcements, common knowledge and private suspicions; Alexandru Baltag, Lawrence S. Moss and Sławomir Solecki.- 34. A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision; Alexandru Baltag and Sonja Smets.- 35. Agreeing to disagree; Robert J. Aumann.- 36. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium; Robert J. Aumann and Adam Brandenburger.- 37. Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games; Robert Stalnaker.- 38. Substantive rationality and backward induction; JosephY. Halpern.
