Simple Models of Income Redistribution

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Simple Models of Income Redistribution

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 292 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9783319725017
  • DDC分類 339.52

Full Description

The rising role of intra- and intergenerational transfers (e.g. basic income, child benefit and public pensions) characterises modern economies, yet most models depicting these transfers are too sophisticated for a wider but mathematically trained audience. This book presents simple models to fill the gap. The author considers a benevolent government maximizing social welfare by anticipating citizens' shortsighted reaction to the transfer rules. The resulting income redistribution is analyzed for low tax morale, strong labor disutility and heterogeneous life expectancy. Key issues that the book addresses include the socially optimal pension contribution rate, retirement age, and redistribution programs. The author concludes by removing some strong restrictions and introducing median voter, incomplete information and dynamic complications.

The book will be of value for graduate students and researchers interested in public economics, especially in public and private pensions.

Contents

1. Introduction2. Introductory tax models3. Introductory pension models4. Four pension models with two types.5. Proportional (earnings-related) pension system6. Progressive transfer systems7. Cap on contribution base8. Voluntary pension system9. Flexible vs. seniority pensions10. Optimal child benefits and income taxes11. Child support, pension and fertility12. Models of political economy13. Imperfect knowledge of the pension rules: irrational inattention14. Dynamic extensions15. Conclusions