Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate (Springerbriefs in Economics)

Felsenthal, Dan S./ Nurmi, Hannu

Springer International Publishing AG（2017/02発売）

• 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 88 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9783319510606
• DDC分類 320.01

Full Description

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice.

Contents

Non-Monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview.- Descriptions of the Voting Methods to be Analyzed.- Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules.- Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates.- Eight Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Variable Electorates.- Practical Significance and Open Problems.