Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya (Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World)

個数:
電子版価格
¥17,124
  • 電子版あり

Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya (Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World)

  • 提携先の海外書籍取次会社に在庫がございます。通常3週間で発送いたします。
    重要ご説明事項
    1. 納期遅延や、ご入手不能となる場合が若干ございます。
    2. 複数冊ご注文の場合は、ご注文数量が揃ってからまとめて発送いたします。
    3. 美品のご指定は承りかねます。

    ●3Dセキュア導入とクレジットカードによるお支払いについて
  • 【入荷遅延について】
    世界情勢の影響により、海外からお取り寄せとなる洋書・洋古書の入荷が、表示している標準的な納期よりも遅延する場合がございます。
    おそれいりますが、あらかじめご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。
  • ◆画像の表紙や帯等は実物とは異なる場合があります。
  • ◆ウェブストアでの洋書販売価格は、弊社店舗等での販売価格とは異なります。
    また、洋書販売価格は、ご注文確定時点での日本円価格となります。
    ご注文確定後に、同じ洋書の販売価格が変動しても、それは反映されません。
  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 254 p.
  • 商品コード 9783030166946

Full Description

This book examines the full range of counterinsurgency intelligence during the Malayan Emergency. It explores the involvement of the Security Service, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), the Malayan Security Service, Special Branch and wider police service, and military intelligence, to examine how British and Malayan authorities tackled the insurgent challenge posed by the Malayan Communist Party. This study assesses the nature of the intelligence apparatus prior to the declaration of emergency in 1948 and considers how officials attempted to reconstruct the intelligence structures in the Far East after the surrender of the Japanese in 1945. These plans were largely based upon the legacy of the Second World War but quickly ran into difficultly because of ill-defined remits and personality clashes. Nevertheless, officials did provide prescient warning of the existential threat posed by the Malayan Communist Party from the earliest days of British reoccupation of Malaya. Once astate of emergency had been declared, officials struggled to find the right combination of methods, strategy and management structures to eliminate the threat posed by the Communist insurgents. This book argues that the development of an effective counterinsurgency intelligence strategy involved many more organisations than just Special Branch. It was a multifaceted, dynamic effort that took far longer and was more problematic than previous accounts suggest. The Emergency remains central to counterinsurgency theory and thus this wide-ranging analysis sheds crucial light not only on the period, but on contemporary doctrine and security practices today.

Contents

1 Introduction.- 2 Status Quo Ante.- 3 Creating a New Intelligence Apparatus in the Far East.- 4 Organisational Conflict.- 5 Intelligence Prior to the Declaration of Emergency.- 6 Para-Military Intelligence.- 7 Policing and Human Intelligence.- 8 Organising Intelligence.- 9 Conclusion.

最近チェックした商品