Ｏ．Ｅ．ウィリアムソン（共）編／取引費用の経済学（全２巻） TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series)

Ｏ．Ｅ．ウィリアムソン（共）編／取引費用の経済学（全２巻）<br>TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series)

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Ｏ．Ｅ．ウィリアムソン（共）編／取引費用の経済学（全２巻）
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series)

Williamson, Oliver E. (EDT)/ Masten, Scott E. (EDT)

ウェブストア価格 ¥177,648（本体¥161,499）
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd（1995/01発売）
外貨定価 UK£ 615.00
ポイント 1,614pt

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製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 1392 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9781852789527
DDC分類 338.5

基本説明

Oliver E. Williamson is the 2009 Novel Laureate in Economics. Contains a selection of key articles on transaction cost economics by distinguished scholars including Ronald Coase, Herbert Simon, Kenneth Arrow and Richard A. Posner. As well as addressing key areas such as private ordering and credibility, contracts and organization, internal organization, vertical integration and contracting, the editors have each compiled a new introduction to accompany the set.

Full Description

Although what has come to be known as transaction cost economics has its origins in the 1930s, it was not until the 1970s that transaction cost economics as a systematic and identifiable field of study began. Since then, numerous theoretical developments and empirical applications have expanded and enriched the field. Recognition of its contributions to our understanding of organizations and institutions includes two Nobel laureates, Ronald Coase in 1991 and Oliver Williamson in 2009. This is an important selection of key articles on transaction cost economics by distinguished scholars including Ronald Coase, Herbert Simon, Kenneth Arrow and Richard A. Posner. This research review addresses key areas such as private ordering and credibility, contracts and organization, internal organization, vertical integration and contracting.

Volume I
PART ONE: CLASSICS
1. R.H. Coase (1972), 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research.'
2. Kenneth J. Arrow (1974), 'Organization and Information.'
3. Herbert A. Simon (1962), 'The Architecture of Complexity.'

PART II: RUDIMENTS
4. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.'
5. Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.'
6. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.'
7. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Comparative Economic Organization:The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives.'
8. David J. Teece (1982), 'Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm.'

PART III: PRIVATE ORDERING AND CREDIBILITY
9. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), 'The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance.'
10. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange.'
11. Avner Greif (1993), 'Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition.'
12. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.'

PART IV: CONTRACTS AND ORGANIZATION
13. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.'
14. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Righs and the Nature of the Firm.'
15. Michael H. Riordan (1990), 'What is Vertical Integration.'
16. Jean Tirle (1988), 'The Theory of the Firm.'

PART V: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
17. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'The Limits of the Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features.'
18. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), 'Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity.'
19. David M. Kreps (1990), 'Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.'
20. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.'
21. Masahiko Aoki (1990), 'Toward an Economi Model of the Japanese Firm.'

PART VI: PROSPECTS AND RETROSPECTIVE
22. Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1991), 'The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment.'
23. Ronald H. Coase (1991), 'The Institutional Structure of Production.'
24. Richard A. Posner (1993), 'The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics.'
25. Ronald H. Coase (1993), 'Coase on Posner on Coase.'
26. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 'Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics.'

Volume II

PART I: VERTICAL INTEGRATION
1. Benjamin Klein (1988), 'Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership.'
2. Paul L. Joskow (1985), 'Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants.'
3. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), 'Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry.'
4. Scott E. Masten (1984), 'The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry.'
5. Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein (1984), 'Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination.'
6. George John and Barton A. Weitz (1988), 'Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis.'
7. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan Jr. and Edward A. Synder (1991), 'The Costs of Organization.'

PART II: CONTRACTING
8. Thomas M. Palay (1984), 'Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting.'
9. Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), 'Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke.'
10. Paul L. Joskow (1987), 'Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets.'
11. J. Harold Mulherin (1986), 'Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions.'
12. Scott. E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), 'Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas.'
13. Keith B. Leffler and Randal R. Rucker (1991), 'Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts.'
14. Keith J. Crocker and Scott E. Masten (1991), 'Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts.'

PART III: REGULATION AND POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
15. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General and with Respect to CATV.'
16. Victor P. Goldberg (1976), 'Regulation and Administered Contracts.'
17. George L. Priest (1993), 'The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate.'
18. Brian Levy and PabloT. Spiller (1994), 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation.'
19. Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988), 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.'
20. Rafael Gely and Pable T. Spiller (1990), 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases.'

PART IV: ANTITRUST
21. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach.'
22. Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein (1983), 'The Economics of Block Booking.'
23. Scott E. Masten and Edward A. Snyder (1993), 'United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: