Full Description
What does it mean to understand the law? This challenging book discusses whether and how understanding the law is qualitatively different from understanding a different, non-legal text or linguistic utterance, and whether knowledge of a language is sufficient to understand legal content in that language.
Providing a comprehensive overview of current studies of interpretivism, both in the common and civil law systems, this book applies state of the art theories and tools of modern philosophy of language to shed new light on traditional questions in legal theory. Chapters discuss the normative importance and descriptive impact of moral inferences in legal interpretation and critically analyse the claims of legal interpretivism, uncovering the most recent versions of legal positivism. The impressive selection of leading contributors explore an array of important topics including metaethics, expressivism and legal semantics.
Outlining a new direction of study and delineating the path for future research on moral inferences in legal interpretation, this timely book will be a thought-provoking read for legal scholars and students interested in legal theory, philosophy and interpretation.
Contents
Contents:
1 Introduction to Interpretivism and the Limits of Law 1
Izabela Skoczeń
PART I LEGAL REASONING THROUGH THE LENS
OF INTERPRETIVISM
2 Practical reasoning and the communicative model of law 12
Brian H Bix
3 Legal antipositivism and the reliability challenge in metaethics 23
David Plunkett
4 The meaning and interpretation of statutes in
Anglo-American legal systems 43
Jeffrey Goldsworthy
5 The communication theory as a phantom 60
Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki and Francesca Poggi
PART II INTERPRETIVISM VERSUS THE
COMMUNICATIVE MODEL OF LEGAL REASONING
6 Why the anti-positivists' concept of practice is too thin 77
Marcin Matczak
7 Legal interpretivism: all or some? 96
Adam Dyrda
8 Interpretation and the bounds of reason 113
Giovanni Tuzet
PART III LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL MEANING
9 The authoritative intention thesis 130
Torben Spaak
10 Distinguishing the distinguishable: interpretative norms
and interpretative criteria in adjudication of meaning 146
David Duarte and Pedro Moniz Lopes
11 From rule-scepticism to the interpretive orthodoxy? On
Wittgenstein, legal theory, and the difference between
understanding and interpreting a rule 159
Paolo Sandro
PART IV THE SEMANTICS AND META-SEMANTICS
OF LEGAL CONTENT
12 Semantic theories and interpretation: a critique of Michael
S Green's 'Dworkin's Fallacy' 176
Thomas Bustamante and Thiago Lopes Decat
13 When expressiveness flows back: the symbolic functions
of legislation and their legal significance 194
Francesco Ferraro
14 Expressivism and the ex aequo et bono adjudication method 212
Izabela Skoczeń and Krzysztof Posłajko
15 Semantics of institutional names 229
Paweł Banaś
Index 246
