Full Description
This insightful book examines the inherent fragility of modern liberal constitutionalism and shows how it is in the nature of every constitutional community, including the European Union, to try to protract its own duration as much as possible. The book considers the strengths, weaknesses, tensions, and contradictions of European constitutionalism using the lens of constitutional time.
The author's claim is that duration should not be sought just for its own sake: an internal link between constitutionalism and democracy should be ensured. He suggests two options to achieve this objective. The first centres on decision-making at the subnational or local level and by intermediate bodies, including cities and regions as well as political parties and private bodies. The second focuses on the promotion of socio-economic rights and welfare standards. Through these debates a theory of 'communal constitutionalism' is proposed - placing emphasis on the role of future generations. Combining temporal and reflexive dimensions it addresses the questions of how to be 'secure' and what it means for the EU polity to be 'secure'.
This expertly crafted book will be essential reading for students and scholars of constitutional and administrative law, European law, and legal theory. It will also be of interest to political scientists looking at European constitutionalism and sociologists interested in the development of law beyond the State.
Contents
Contents: 1. Constitutionalism ideal-types 2. Framing EU constitutional time: a future-oriented theory of constitutional change for the EU 3. The rule of law and populism 4. Longue durée and the economic constitution 5. Communal constitutionalism and the paradox of 'large time' 6. The EU and constitutional time: conclusions Bibliography Index
