Full Description
This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.
Each chapter presents an expository primer on a particular topic or theme within social choice, with the aim of making the material fully accessible to students and scholars in economics, political science, mathematics, philosophy, law and other fields of study. Topics covered include preference aggregation, voting rules, spatial models, methodology and empirical applications.
Scholars, graduate students and even advanced undergraduates in a variety of disciplines will find this introductory and relatively non-technical book an indispensable addition to the field.
Contributors: J.F. Adams, W.T. Bianco, A. Blais, P.J. Coughlin, K.L. Dougherty, D.S. Felsenthal, T.H. Hammond, C. Hare, J.C. Heckelman, R.G. Holcombe, C. Kam, M.M. Kaminski, M. Machover, B.C. McCannon, I. McLean, N.R. Miller, S. Moser, E.M. Penn, K.T. Poole, R. Ragan, D.G. Saari, I. Sened, R.A. Smyth, N. Tideman
Contents
Contents:
1. Introduction: Issues in Social Choice and Voting
Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. Miller
PART I PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CHOICE
2. The Strange History of Social Choice
Iain McLean
3. Unanimous Consent and Constitutional Economics
Randall G. Holcombe
4. Rational Choice and the Calculus of Voting
André Blais
5. Computational Social Choice
Robi Ragan
PART II PAIRWISE SOCIAL CHOICE
6. Majority Rule and Tournament Solutions
Scott Moser
7. Supermajority Rules
Keith L. Dougherty
8. The Measurement of a Priori Voting Power
Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
9. Condorcet Jury Theorems
Bryan C. McCannon
PART III SPATIAL MODELS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
10. The Spatial Model of Social Choice and Voting
Nicholas R. Miller
11. A Unified Spatial Model of American Political Institutions
Thomas H. Hammond
12. Competing for Votes
James F. Adams
13. Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition
Peter J. Coughlin
PART IV SOCIAL CHOICE FROM MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES
14. Arrow's Theorem and Its Descendants
Elizabeth Maggie Penn
15. Properties and Paradoxes of Common Voting Rules
Jac C. Heckelman
16. Voting Mysteries: A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words
Donald G. Saari
17. Multiple-Winner Voting Rules
Nicolaus Tideman
PART V EMPIRICAL SOCIAL CHOICE
18. Measuring Ideology in Congress
Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole
19. The Uncovered Set and its Applications
William T. Bianco, Christopher Kam, Itai Sened and Regina A. Smyth
19. Empirical Examples of Voting Paradoxes
Marek M. Kaminski
Index
