公共経済学の代替的理論:ハンドブック<br>A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics

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公共経済学の代替的理論:ハンドブック
A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 576 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9781781004708
  • DDC分類 336

Full Description

This comprehensive and thought-provoking Handbook reviews public sector economics from pluralist perspectives that either complement or reach beyond mainstream views.The book takes a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach, drawing on economic elements in the fields of philosophy, sociology, psychology, history and law. The expert contributors present new methodological approaches across these disciplines in five distinct sections:

'Revisiting the Theoretical Foundations' compares and contrasts Austrians, Marxists, public choice theorists and Keynesians
'Revisiting the Values' is concerned with justice, welfare, religions and civil rights
'Beyond Rationalistic Rational Choice' includes chapters devoted to memory, information and group motivation
The final sections on 'Optimal Government and Government Failure' and 'Public Economics of Public Bads' deal with competition among governments, their suboptimal size, regulation, corruption, the informal economy, cognitive dissonance, rent seeking, the UN and criminal cycles.
Academics, researchers and students with an interest in economics - particularly public sector economics and Austrian economics - and public policy will find this Handbook to be an invaluable reference tool.

Contributors: F. Acacia, J. Alm, G. Brady, G. Brosio, M. Caputo, M. Casson, G. Coco, M. Cubel Sanchez, S. Fedeli, M. Florio, F. Forte, N. Goldschmit, A. Habisch, M. Holler, J. Huerta de Soto, J.P. Jimenez, A. Koziashvili, M.A. Leroch, C. Magazzino, M. Mantovani, D. Montolio, R. Mudami, D.C. Mueller, S. Nitzan, D.M.A. Patti, P. Salin, P. Salmon, F. Sobbrio, V. Tanzi, Y. Tobol, B.A. Wickström, R. Zanola

Contents

Contents:

PART I: REVISITING THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
1. The Neglected Importance of the Austrian Thought in Public Economics
Pascal Salin

2. In Defense of the Euro: An Austrian Perspective
Jesús Huerta de Soto

3. Marxian Public Economics. With a Comment by Massimo Florio
Giuseppe Coco and Silvia Fedeli

4. The Laffer Curve Muddle
Vito Tanzi

5. Deficits, Tax Burden and Unemployment
Silvia Fedeli and Francesco Forte

PART II: REVISITING THE VALUES
6. Theories of Justice and Empirical Results
Manfred Holler and Martin Leroch

7. Strategic Voting and Happiness
Francesca Acacia and Maria Cubel Sanchez

8. Religious Parties
Dennis C. Müller

9. Western Religion, Social Ethics and Public Economics
Nils Goldschmit and Andre Habisch

10. Indigenes, Immigration, and Integration: A Welfare-Economics Approach to Minority Rights
Bengt Arne Wickstrom

PART III: BEYOND RATIONALISTIC RATIONAL CHOICE
11. The Role of Memory in Modeling Social and Economic Cycles of Extreme Events
Michele Caputo

12. Expanding the Theory of Tax Compliance from Individual to Group Motivations
James Alm

13. The Political Economy of News Media: Theory, Evidence and Open Issues
Francesco Sobbrio

PART IV: OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT FAILURE
14. How Significant is Yardstick Competition among Governments? Three Reasons to Dig Deeper
Pierre Salmon

15. Optimal Size of Government and Optimal Ratio between Current and Capital Expenditure
Francesco Forte and Cosimo Magazzino

16. Government Failures in Railway Public Policy. The British Case
Mark Casson

17. Cognitive Dissonance, Iron Triangle and Rent seeking. Sequester and the Fiscal Cliff
Gordon Brady

18. Cognitive Dissonance, Efficient and Inefficient Rent Seeking. Public Aid to the Movies
Francesco Forte and Michela Mantovani

PART V: PUBLIC ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC BADS
19. Bargaining in International Conflicts Resolution: UN Involvement and Conflict Settlement
Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti and Daniel Montolio

20. The Norm of Profits Extraction from Corruption by Bureaucracy and Market Size
Arkadi Koziashvili, Shmuel Nitzan and Jossef Tobol

21. Alternative Views on the Origins and Impact of the Informal Economy
Giorgio Brosio, Juan Pablo Jimenez and Roberto Zanola

22. Long-run and Shorter-run Criminal Cycles in the Economics of Public Bads
Michele Caputo, Francesco Forte and Michela Mantovani

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