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基本説明
If what we do is in large part determined by our genes, our circumstances, or other factors, can we have free will? Or are free will and determinism imcompatible?
Full Description
The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. Incompatibilism's Allure provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling account for incompatibilism's continuing allure.
Contents
Acknowledgements
ONE INTRODUCTION
The Robert Harris Case
The Ann/Beth Cases
Responsibility, Causal Determinism, and Free Action
Two Views About the Concept of Responsibility
Free Action
Causal Determinism
Some Definitions: Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism
Different Pathways to Incompatibilism
Prospectus
TWO THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT
The Consequence Argument
The Logical Modalities
Peter van Inwagen's Version of the ConsequenceArgument
A Problem Concerning the Interpretation of 'Can'
The Hypothetical Sense of 'Can'
The Categorical Sense of 'Can'
The Reformulated Consequence Argument
Control
Active Control
The Event Causal Theory of Action and Deviance
Ultimate Control
The Negative Conception of Ultimate Origination
The Positive Conception of Ultimate Origination
Compatibilist Conceptions of Ultimate Origination
Assessing the Reformulated Consequence Argument
The Basic Version of the Consequence Argument
Appendix Local Miracle Compatibilism
A.1 Local Miracle Compatibilism
A.2 An Objection to Local Miracle Compatibilism
THREE ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Consequence Argument and Freedom to do Otherwise
Frankfurt-Type Examples and Freedom to do Otherwise
The Dilemma Objection
Mele and Robb's Reply to the Dilemma Objection
Another Reply to the Dilemma Objection
Luck and Alternative Possibilities
FOUR THE DIRECT ARGUMENT
Introduction
The Direct Argument
Transfer NR and Two-Path Cases
David Widerker's Response to the Direct Argument
Widerker's Concerns
Reply to Widerker
A New Counterexample
On the Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility
A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Obligation
An Informal Presentation of the Counterexample to Transfer NR
Filling in the Details of the Counterexample
FIVE THE DEONTIC ARGUMENT
Introduction
The Deontic Argument
Problems with the Deontic Argument
Genuine Moral Dilemmas and "Ought" Implies "Can"
Self-Imposed Impossibility and "Ought" Implies "Can"
Changing Obligations with Passing Time
Reply to the Objection
Negative Duties and "Ought Not" Implies "Can Refrain From"
Does Blameworthiness Require Wrongness and Does Praiseworthiness Require Obligatoriness?
A Counterexample to the Principle that Blameworthiness Requires Wrongness
Supererogatory and Suberogatory Actions
The Coming Apart of Blameworthiness and Wrongness
Blameworthiness and Frankfurt Examples
SIX THE MANIPULATION ARGUMENT
The Basic Contours of the Argument
The Manipulation Argument
Hard Incompatibilism and the Four-Case Argument
McKenna's Hard-Line Response to the Argument
The Hard-Line Reply
Concerns with the Hard-Line Reply
On Pereboom's Principle O of Ultimate Origination
Principle O, Magical Agents, and God
Principle O and Indoctrination
Principle O and Control
A Proposal
SEVEN AUTHENTIC SPRINGS OF ACTION
Toward a Soft-Line Reply to the Manipulation Argument
Internalism versus Externalism
Magical Agents and Global Manipulation: An Argument forInternalism
Why the Argument Fails
An Agency Requirement of Responsibility
Children and the Authenticity of their Developing Evaluative Schemes
Authentic Evolved Schemes
Some Objections and Responses
Evaluative Schemes and Personal Identity
Evaluative Schemes and Drastic Change
Evaluative Schemes and Ambiguity of 'Autonomy'
Reply to the Magical Agents Argument
Internalism's Domain
A Soft-Line Reply to the Four-Case Argument
EIGHT THE IMPOSSIBILITY ARGUMENT
Introduction
The Impossibility Argument
Assessing the Impossibility Argument
A Problem Concerning Magical Agents and God
A Problem Concerning Agency
A Problem Concerning Control
The Impossibility Argument and Negative Ultimate Control
The Impossibility Argument and Agent-Causal Ultimate Control
The Impossibility Argument and Compatibilist Ultimate Control
NINE LIBERTARIANISM AND THE LUCK OBJECTION
Libertarianism and Luck
Event Causal Modest Libertarianism
Nonaction-Centered Modest Libertarianism
Action Centered Modest Libertarianism
Introducing the Luck Objection
Luck, Explanation, and Control
Akratic Action
Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Akratic Action
Luck's Persistence
Clarke's Hybrid Account and the Luck Objection
Accounts of Causation
Clarke's Hybrid Agent-Causal Account
The Hybrid Account and Luck
Mele's Daring Soft-Libertarian Reply
Akratic Action vs. Actions that Manifest Agency Breakdown
The Daring Reply
Brief Wrap-Up
References
Index
