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Full Description
Is morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology or divine command?
This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's Defence of Duty. To make this case, the book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.
Contents
PrefaceSeries Editor's Introduction
Part I: Reid's Rejection of Moral Subjectivism
Chapter 1. Reid's Way of Philosophy
Chapter 2. Reid, Perception and Common Sense
Chapter 3. Reid's Arguments against Moral Subjectivity
Part II: Reid's Account of Duty
Chapter 4. Defining Duty
Chapter 5. Moral Perception
Chapter 6. Moral Motivation
Part III: Objections to Reid's Account
Chapter 7. The Argument from Strangeness
Chapter 8. The Argument from Relativity
Chapter 9. The Argument from Interminability
Conclusion: The Practical Implications of Reid's Defence of DutyWorks CitedIndex
