Samuelson's Frankenstein : Fiduciary Duty and the Misguiding Hand of University Investment Education

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Samuelson's Frankenstein : Fiduciary Duty and the Misguiding Hand of University Investment Education

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 150 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9781472418029
  • DDC分類 650

Full Description


Modern economics is really the application of mathematics to economics. The Samuelson of this book's title is the great MIT economist Paul Samuelson, who spoke of 'fiendish Frankenstein monsters' following the Wall Street collapse, expressing horror and shame that in the field of mathematical economics that he had led, scholars had used fancy mathematical investment theories to create and spread the confusion and misunderstanding that had caused the collapse, throwing millions out of jobs or homes and shrinking almost everyone's retirement funds. In the wake of the more recent collapse of the early 21st Century, resentment of the financial industry has reached new heights. Books have poured forth, many from academics attacking Wall Street and condemning financial advisors for misleading the investing public in pursuit of higher fees. In Samuelson's Frankenstein Dick Purcell traces the roots of the tendency to confuse and mislead the investing public and finds the cause of the trouble to be the investment education provided in universities by eminent professors whose own words expose their culpability. Purcell argues that for several decades now, our universities and professors have delivered investment education that has led to the investing public being misled in ways that favour academic interests and the financial industry. This, he asserts, has happened in spite of innovations during the 1950s, which was a time when great strides were made in pursuit of ideas that actually served individual investors' best interests. The author believes that modern portfolio theory, a misapplication of at least one of the innovations of the 1950s, is a substantial reason why yet another more-or-less collapse of the system has occurred. This book calls for a new investment education that revisits the 1950s advances and effectively combines them to offer clear guidance for those seeking the best investments and probabilities for their retirement, their children's

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