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基本説明
Presents a radical new moral theory that makes exemplars the foundation of ethics; and new theories of epistemic vices such as epistemic malevolence and epistemic self-indulgence.
Full Description
Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic presents a series of essays by leading ethicists and epistemologists who offer the latest thinking on the moral and intellectual virtues and vices, the structure of virtue theory, and the connections between virtue and emotion.
Cuts across two fields of philosophical inquiry by featuring a dual focus on ethics and epistemology
Features cutting-edge work on the moral and intellectual virtues and vices, the structure of virtue theory, and the connections between virtue and emotion
Presents a radical new moral theory that makes exemplars the foundation of ethics; and new theories of epistemic vices such as epistemic malevolence and epistemic self-indulgence
Represents one of the few collections to address both the moral virtues and the epistemic virtues
Explores a new approach in epistemology - virtue epistemology - which emphasizes the importance of intellectual character traits
Contents
Notes on Contributors vii
1 Introduction: Virtue and Vice 1
Heather Battaly
Part 1: The Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology
2 Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology 21
Roger Crisp
3 Exemplarist Virtue Theory 39
Linda Zagzebski
4 Right Act, Virtuous Motive 57
Thomas Hurka
Part 2: Virtue and Context
5 Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad 73
Guy Axtell
6 Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism 95
Sarah Wright
Part 3: Virtue and Emotion
7 Virtue, Emotion, and Attention 115
Michael S. Brady
8 Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons from the Ancients on Emotion and Virtue-Acquisition 133
Amy Coplan
Part 4: Virtues and Vices
9 A Challenge to Intellectual Virtue from Moral Virtue: The Case of Universal Love 153
Christine Swanton
10 Open-Mindedness 173
Wayne Riggs
11 Epistemic Malevolence 189
Jason Baehr
12 Epistemic Self-Indulgence 215
Heather Battaly
Index 237



