Full Description
In December 1943, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton resigned from command of the 1st Canadian Army amidst criticism of his poor generalship and of his abrasive personality. Despite McNaughton's importance to the Canadian Army during the first four years of the Second World War, little has been written about the man himself or the circumstances of his resignation.
In The Politics of Command, the first full-length study of the subject since 1969, John Nelson Rickard analyses McNaughton's performance during Exercise SPARTAN in March 1943 and assesses his relationships with key figures such as Sir Alan F. Brooke, Bernard Paget, and Harry Crerar. This detailed re-examination of McNaughton's command argues that the long-accepted reasons for his relief of duty require extensive modification.
Based on a wide range of sources, The Politics of Command will redefine how military historians and all Canadians look at not only "Andy" McNaughton but also the Canadian Army itself.
Contents
Maps
Tables and Figures
Foreword by Marc Milner
Preface by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
Part One: The Making of Andy McNaughton
1. Early Life and the Crucible of the First World War
2. The Road to High Command
Part Two: The Problem of Deploying the Army
3. A Willingness to Fight, 1940-1941
4. From ROUNDUP to TORCH
5. Practical Operations of War
Part Three: McNaughton as Military Commander and Trainer
6. The Difficulty of Training in 1940
7. The Politics of Training
8. Enter Montgomery
9. Exercise SPARTAN
10. The Long Shadow of Spartan
Part Four: The End of an Idea
11. The Sicily Incident
12. Broken Dagger: A Corps in Italy
13. The Final Months of McNaughton's Command
Epilogue
Conclusion
Appendices
Notes
Bibliography
Index
