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Full Description
Demonstrates the unique, pervasive, and overwhelmingly important role of other people within our lived experience.
Drawing on the original phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Simone de Beauvoir, and John Russon, as well as recent research in child psychology, The Other in Perception argues for perception's inherently existential significance: we always perceive a world and not just objective facts. The world is the rich domain of our personal and interpersonal lives, and central to this world is the role of other people. We are "paired" with others such that our perception is really the enactment of a coinhabiting of a shared world. These relations with others shape the very way in which we perceive our world. Susan Bredlau explores two uniquely formative domains in which our pairing relations with others are particularly critical: childhood development and sexuality. It is through formative childhood experience that the essential, background structures of our world are instituted, which has important consequences for our developed perceptual life. Sexuality is an analogous domain of formative intersubjective experience. Taken as a whole, Bredlau demonstrates the unique, pervasive, and overwhelmingly important role of other people within our lived experience.
Contents
Acknowledgments
A Note on Citations
Introduction
1. Phenomenology
Introduction
Husserl and Intentionality
Merleau-Ponty and Embodiment
Russon and Polytemporality
Conclusion
2. The Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Others
Introduction
Husserl and the "Pairing" Relation
Merleau-Ponty on the Perception of Others
Russon and the Others within Our Own Bodies
Conclusion
3. The Institution of Interpersonal Life
Introduction
Perceiving through Others: Neonate Imitation, Joint Attention, and Mutual Gaze
Infant-Caregiver Play Periods as "Pairings"
Caregiver "Availability" and the Impact of Pairing Relations on Infant Perception
Pairing and Trust
Russon on Pairing as the Institution of Personality
Conclusion
4. Recognition and Sexuality
Introduction
Childhood Intimacy and Adult Intimacy
Sexuality as a Bodily Intentionality
Hegel on Recognizing Subjects as Subjects
Sexuality as Embodied Recognition
Sexuality and Interpersonal Vulnerability
Sexuality and Freedom
Conclusion
Conclusion: The Concrete Ethics of Lived Experience
Notes
Bibliography
Index
