Full Description
This book is about the regulation of corporations that use bribery in international commerce to win or maintain overseas business contracts and interests. Recent large-scale cases involving multinational corporations demonstrate how large commercial 'non-criminal' enterprises are being implicated in substantive overseas bribery scandals and illustrate the difficulties faced by responsible enforcement authorities in the UK and Germany. The book imports concepts from regulation theory to aid our understanding of the emerging enforcement, self-regulatory and hybrid responses to transnational corporate bribery. Lord implements a qualitative, comparative research strategy involving semi-structured interviews, participant observation and document analysis to provide empirical insights into this relatively invisible area of criminological interest. Despite significant cultural differences between the jurisdictions, this book argues that UK and German anti-corruption authorities face procedural, evidential, legal, financial and structural difficulties that are leading to convergence in prosecution policies. Although self-regulatory and hybrid mechanisms are aiding the response and gaining some level of regulation, the default position is one of accommodation by state agencies, even where the will to enforce the law is high. This book is essential reading for academics and students researching corporate and white-collar crimes and the concept of regulation more generally, as well as law enforcement agencies and international and intergovernmental organisations concerned with anti-corruption.
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 What is 'Transnational Corporate Bribery' and Why Do We Need to Regulate It?; Chapter 3 Conceptualising the 'Regulatory' Framework: Policing as Regulation; Chapter 4 Legal Frameworks for Enforcement: From the International to the National; Chapter 5 1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as follows: Lord, N. (2014) 'Detecting and investigating transnational corporate bribery in centralised and decentralised enforcement systems: discretion and (de-)prioritisation in the UK and Germany' Policing and Society, DOI: 10.1080/10439463.2014.895350; Chapter 6 Theories of Enforcement: Prosecution Policies; Chapter 7 Theories of Self-regulation: Manufactured and Organic Self-regulatory Practices; Chapter 8 Understanding 'Regulatory' Performance and Determining 'Adequate' Enforcement; Chapter 9 The 'Default Position': Accommodating Transnational Corporate Bribery;
