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基本説明
Addresses such topics as the amount of innate knowledge, bounded rationality and the role of perception in action; each question is treated by essays written by renowned experts in the fields and especially commissioned for the volume.
Full Description
This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions.
The debates are written by renowned experts in the field.
The debates cover the middle ground as well as the extremes
Addresses topics such as the amount of innate knowledge, bounded rationality and the role of perception in action.
Provides valuable overview of the field in a clear and easily comprehensible form.
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Notes on Contributors viii
Preface xiii
Just How Modular Is the Mind? 1
1 The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind 3
Peter Carruthers
2 Is the Mind Really Modular? 22
Jesse J. Prinz
3 Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? 37
Richard Samuels
How Much Knowledge of Language Is Innate? 57
4 Irrational Nativist Exuberance 59
Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K. Pullum
5 The Case for Linguistic Nativism 81
Robert J. Matthews
6 On the Innateness of Language 97
James McGilvray
Has Cognitive Science Shown That Human Beings Are Cognitively Bounded, Or Irrational? 113
7 Bounded and Rational 115
Gerd Gigerenzer
8 Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue 134
David Matheson
Are Rules and Representations Necessary To Explain Systematicity? 145
9 Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules 147
Terence Horgan and John Tienson
10 Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective 159
Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel
Can Consciousness and Qualia Be Reduced? 187
11 Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced 189
William G. Lycan
12 Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced 202
Brie Gertler
Does Cognitive Science Need External Content at All? 217
13 Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) 219
Ray Jackendoff
14 The Intentional Inexistence of Language - But Not Cars 237
Georges Rey
Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 257
15 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 259
Kirk Ludwig
16 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the "No" Side 275
Christopher Viger
Can Mental States, Knowledge in Particular, Be Divided Into a Narrow Component and a Broad Component? 289
17 Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External Components? 291
Timothy Williamson
18 The Internal and External Components of Cognition 307
Ralph Wedgwood
Index 326