Full Description
Is knowledge relative? Many academics across the humanities say that it is. However those who work in mainstream epistemology generally consider that it is not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions whether the kind of anti-relativistic background that underlies typical projects in mainstream epistemology can on closer inspection be vindicated.
Contents
1. Metaepistemology and Realism 2. Global Relativism 3. The Pyrrhonian Argument for Epistemic Relativism 4. Dialogic Arguments for Epistemic Relativism 5. Incommensurability, Circularity and Epistemic Relativism 6. Replacement Relativism: Boghossian, Kusch and Wright 7. A Different Kind of Epistemic Relativism 8. New Relativism: Epistemic Aftermath 9. Metaepistemology and Relativism
