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Full Description
Why do some donor governments pursue international development through recipient governments, while others bypass such local authorities? Weaving together scholarship in political economy, public administration and historical institutionalism, Simone Dietrich argues that the bureaucratic institutions of donor countries shape donor-recipient interactions differently despite similar international and recipient country conditions. Donor nations employ institutional constraints that authorize, enable and justify particular aid delivery tactics while precluding others. Offering quantitative and qualitative analyses of donor decision-making, the book illuminates how donors with neoliberally organized public sectors bypass recipient governments, while donors with more traditional public-sector-oriented institutions cooperate and engage recipient authorities on aid delivery. The book demonstrates how internal beliefs and practices about states and markets inform how donors see and set their objectives for foreign aid and international development itself. It informs debates about aid effectiveness and donor coordination and carries implications for the study of foreign policy, more broadly.
Contents
1. States, Markets and Foreign Aid: A Political Economy of Aid Delivery Tactics; 2. How National Structures Shape Foreign Aid Delivery; 3. Examining the Causal Mechanism Across Donors: the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, and France; 4. Country-level Evidence Linking Donor Political Economies to Variation in Aid Delivery; 5. Testing the Argument with Evidence from Aid Officials from the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, France, and Japan; 6. Examining Public Opinion as an Alternative Explanation: Evidence from survey experiments with voters in the United States and Germany; 7. Implications for Aid Effectiveness, Public Policy, and Future Research.
