Full Description
This title was first published in 2003. Examining, monitoring and enforcement, this volume comprises some of the best papers from the last 30 years of work on the subject. Organized according to subject area, the book allows unprecedented access to the often ignored concepts of the compliance challenge. Empirically rich and exhibiting a high level of ingenuity, this is an indispensable resource for studies and research in environmental economics. The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy explores the influence of economics on the development of environmental and natural resource policy. In a series of twenty five volumes, the most significant journal essays in key areas of contemporary environmental and resource policy are collected. This volume examines monitoring and enforcement, collecting some of the best papers from the last 30 years of work on the subject. Organized according to subject area, the book allows unprecedented access to the often ignored concepts of the compliance challenge. Empirically rich and exhibiting a high level of ingenuity, this is an indispensable resource for studies and research in environmental economics.
Contents
Contentsof law, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. The Choice of Policy Instruments: The economics of enforcing air pollution controls, Paul B. Downing and William D. Watson Jr; Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes, Jon D. Harford; Enforcement costs and the choice of policy instruments for controlling pollution, Arun S. Malik. Elaboration of Themes: The Design of Penalties: The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement: an economic analysis, Kathleen Segerson and Tom Tietenberg; Guilty until proven innocent - regulation with costly and limited enforcement, Joseph E. Swierzbinski; Garbage, recycling, and illicit burning or dumping, Don Fullerton and Thomas C. Kinnaman. Self-Reporting Discharges: Self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations, Jon D. Harford; Self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution, Arun S. Malik. Stochasticity of Discharges and Errors of Inference in Monitoring: Firm behaviour under regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints, Brian Beavis and Ian Dobbs. Extension of the Basic Template: Using Ex-Post Liability: Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control, Kathleen Segerson. Using the Regulatory Control: Cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatory enforcement, John T. Scholz; Game models for structuring monitoring and enforcement systems, Clifford S. Russell; An integrated strategy to reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, E. Hentschel and A. Randall. Private and Voluntary Approaches: Optimal standards with incomplete enforcement, W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser; Public mechanisms to support compliance to an environmental norm, John K. Stranlund; Private enforcement of federal environmental law, Wendy Naysnerski and Tom Tietenberg. Empirical Work: Describing the M&E Situation in the US: Monitoring and enforcement, Clifford S. Russell; Environmental crime and punishment: legal/economic theory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal; environmental statutes, Mark A. Cohen. Do Monitoring and Enforcement Efforts Make a Difference?: Effectiveness of the EPA's regulatory enforcement: the case of industrial effluent standards, Wesley A. Magat and W. Kip Viscusi; Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec, BenoA (R)t Laplante and Paul Rilstone. Costs and Benefit of Monitoring and Enforcement: The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement, Mark A. Cohen. Explaining the Behaviour of Enforcement Agencies: Standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited, Carol Adaire Jones; The revealed preferences of state EPAs: stringency, enforcement and substitution, Eric Helland; Name index.
