Full Description
This book provides an original theoretically and empirically grounded analysis of regulatory enforcement activism in post-crisis periods and the ensuing regulatory interactions. It critically addresses the 'more regulation' enforcement agenda relating to financial misconduct in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, showing how misconduct was constructed through the enforcement policies and practices of the powerful UK financial conduct regulator and its interactions with the subjects of enforcement proceedings and their legal representatives during a tumultuous time in the financial markets. Drawing from interviews with regulators, professional intermediaries, and markets participants; documentary analysis of enforcement decisions and speeches; and observations, the volume adopts an interdisciplinary approach grounded in social constructivist perspectives on compliance and deviance, regulation theory, and socio-legal research. Through a multi-dimensional analytical framework of regulatory enforcement activism that links shifts in regulatory policymaking; experimentations with legal powers in information-gathering, legal and extra-legal penalties, and individual accountability; and the use of enforcement tools in micro-level interactions, the book documents a more interventionist and punitive post-crisis enforcement agenda. The findings challenge current thinking in the 'scandal and reform' literature. The work argues that despite the increased focus on enforcement, it is not necessarily the case that the power has tilted more towards the regulator. This fine-grained socio-legal enquiry makes innovative and timely theoretical contributions to our understanding of the limitations of regulatory activism and regulatory control, regulatory relationships, the governance of financial markets, and broader thinking on regulating corporations and the individuals within them. It will appeal to academics, researchers, regulators, and policymakers working in regulation across law, criminology, sociology, and politics.
Contents
1. Introduction; 2. The More Punitive Turn in Regulatory Enforcement; 3. Detecting Financial Misconduct and the Informational Traffic: Mutual Risk Mitigation; 4. The Cooperative Context during the Contentious Enforcement Procedure: Investigations and Settlements; 5. Reputation as a Resource in the Governance of Financial Markets; 6. Corporate Managers as 'Objects of Control'; 7. Conclusion
